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SUMMARY
Three aspects of the drug development process are little understood in the literature: 1) which type of
organization has comparative advantage in conducting clinical trials, firms or nonprofit organization
(NPOs)?; 2) what determines the timing of technological collaboration, a step usually far away from
drug commercialization?; and 3) how the strategies making, allying, and buying R&D impact the
probability of drug approval? Using data on over 20,000 clinical trials, 800 technological alliances,
and 14,000 R&D projects, the main findings of this econometric study are: 1) firms complete each
phase of clinical trial faster than nonprofit organizations; 2) licensor scientific and technological
specialization is the main factor to speed up the technological collaboration; and 3) R&D projects
developed by research alliance have higher probability of drug approval than internal R&D projects,
but R&D projects originated from M&A have lower probability of drug approval than internal R&D
projects. Together these findings inform policy makers and managers on how to foster the innovation




Innovation has a high impact on life span and social welfare. In the biopharmaceutical industry,
innovation is mainly represented by a new drug; whereas a patent is an important measure of inven-
tion. There is long shot between the invention, the discovery of a chemical or biological compound,
until the drug commercialization. Before drug approval, the compound must be tested in terms of
safety and efficacy under the clinical trial phases I, II, and III. Three aspects of the drug develop-
ment process are little understood in the literature: 1) which type of organization has comparative
advantage in conducting clinical trials, firms or nonprofit organization (NPOs)?; 2) what determines
the timing of technological collaboration or research alliance?; and 3) how the strategies making,
allying, and buying research and development (R&D) impact the probability of drug approval? This
dissertation supports the thesis that: 1) firms complete clinical trials faster than NPOs, an evidence
of relative efficiency of firms; 2) licensor scientific and technological specialization is the main
factor to speed up the technological collaboration; and 3) considering internal R&D projects as
benchmark, R&D projects developed by research alliance have higher probability of drug approval,
but R&D projects originated from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have lower probability of drug
approval.
In chapter 2, using data on over 20,000 clinical trials started during 2006 to 2011, this study
compares the duration of phase I, II, III, and IV between firms and nonprofit organizations (NPOs).
After controlling for clinical trial characteristics, disease variation, external collaboration, scale
of the organization, and other factors, we found that firms complete each phase of clinical trial on
average 13 months early than NPOs. We interpret this result as evidence that firms are more efficient
in late-stage of R&D process in comparison to NPOs. We also found that the external support by a
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NPO delays the duration of clinical trials on average 4 months; whereas the external support by a
firm doesn’t affect the duration of clinical trials. Size of the organization, and previous experience
in clinical trials don’t appear to affect the duration of clinical trials. Together our results inform
policymakers on the debate of publicization vs privatization of clinical trials.
In chapter 3, using a sample on over 800 technological alliances in the biopharmaceutical sector,
we investigate how scientific and technological specialization affect the timing of technological col-
laboration. We propose a new measure of specialization and timing of technological collaboration.
As each alliance targets a specific technology (for example: monoclonal antibodies, recombinant
DNA, and stem cells) or disease (for example: leukemia, diabetes, and Parkinson’s disease), we
could count the scientific publications and patents that have these keywords in the title or abstract.
Related to the timing of technological collaboration, we measure the timing between the licensor
first scientific publication (that cites a specific technology or disease) and the starting date of the
alliance. After controlling for several factors at alliance and firm level, we found that licensor spe-
cialization is the main factor to speed up the technological collaboration. An increase of 10% in
the scientific specialization speeds up the technological collaboration on average 4 months, and an
increase of 10% in the technological specialization speeds up the technological collaboration on
average 5 months. Furthermore, our results suggest that licensee scientific and technological spe-
cialization in the same technology or disease of the licensor don’t affect the timing of technological
collaboration. A finding that is aligned with the theory of comparative advantage, as specializa-
tion must be in different tasks or stages, in order to explore the differences in opportunity cost and
potential complementarities between activities.
Chapter 4 compares the innovation productivity of the strategies: making, allying, and buying.
Using data on over 14,000 R&D projects started during 1989 to 2007 in the pharmaceutical indus-
try, we found that if external R&D projects are defined as projects developed in research alliance
and projects originated from M&A, there is no difference between the probability of drug approval
of internal R&D projects and external R&D projects. However, when the external R&D projects
is split in a relevant category research alliance and M&A, R&D projects developed by research
alliance have higher probability of drug approval than internal R&D projects, but R&D projects
originated from M&A have lower probability of drug approval than internal R&D projects. We also
found that the success of a research alliance or M&A depends positively on who is the partner or
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the targeted firm. Research alliances between big pharmaceutical firms have higher probability of
success than research alliances between a big pharmaceutical firm and small/medium firm. Fur-
thermore, the results suggest that despite the firms strategically use external R&D to strengthen the
R&D portfolio in a specific anatomical therapeutic class or diversify to different anatomical thera-
peutic class, these strategies are not predictors of innovation performance in terms of drug approval.
Together these findings suggest that big pharmaceutical firms are not in-licensing “lemons” projects
or at least complementarities/synergies generated by the partnership more than compensated loss
due transaction cost and asymmetric information problems.
Chapter 5 presents the conclusion, limitations, and suggestions for future research.
Next section summarizes the evolution of drug discovery process, a background reading for
chapters 2, 3, and 4.
1.1 The Evolution of Drug Discovery Process
In this section, we describe the evolution of drug discovery process from random screening through
rational design to genetic engineering, highlighting the consequences on the market structure of
biopharmaceutical sector.
Random screening is trial and error method with little scientific guidance to find a drug. Without
the understanding of the causes of the disease or the mechanism of action of the drug, it is possible
to infer that a drug works by randomized clinical trial. Until 1950s, most part of chemical drugs
were discovered by Swiss and German firms, using the random screening method [Schwartzman
(1976), Gambardella (1995)].
The birth of pharmaceutical industry can be traced to the Swiss and German chemical firms
like Bayer, Ciba1, Hoechst2, and Sandoz3. In the late 19th century, these firms were already the
world leader producers of organic chemical compounds like dyestuffs, a substance originally used
to add a color. Closer connected with academic institutions, they were also the first firms to create
industrial laboratories to investigate the therapeutic effects of dyestuffs [Chandler (2009), Scherer
(2010), Malerba and Orsenigo (2015)]. The acetylsalicylic acid, known as Aspirin, is an example
1In 1971, Ciba merged with Geigy to form Ciba-Geigy. In 1996, Ciba-Geigy merged with Sandoz to form Novartis.
2In 1999, Hoechst merged with Rhône-Poulenc to form Aventis. In 2005, Aventis became a subsidiary of Sanofi.
3In 1996, Sandoz merged with Ciba-Geigy to form Novartis.
3
of one dyestuff formulation tested in the Bayer laboratory. Other example of dyestuff variant (coal-
tar) is the class of sulfa drugs discovered by IG Farben4 in 1935. Before the mass production of
penicillin in 1944, sulfa drugs were the only effective antibiotic available to treat diseases such as
meningitis, pneumonia, and gonorrhea.
Until the World War II, Swiss and German firms were the drug innovators; whereas the big
pharmaceutical firms of other countries were the national distributors of synthetic coal-tar drugs.
In the random screening era, Swiss and German firms run large scale experiments, tested millions
of compounds, and accumulated extensive libraries about the effects of these compounds. The
economies of scope and scale in R&D process were working as barriers to entry [Henderson and
Cockburn (1996), Chandler (2009), Malerba and Orsenigo (2015)]. However, in the interwar period
American and other European firms started to develop research capabilities, as German firms lost
patents, facilities, and access to global markets. For example, during World War I, US government
sequestered Merck & Co (US subsidiary) from Merck Group (headquarter in Darmstadt, Germany).
Ironically, Merck & Co will become later the most successful firm in the rational drug design and
the genetic engineering era.
In the rational drug design process, biochemistry, microbiology, and enzymology provide guid-
ance about the ideal molecule that would eliminate the pathological agent [Gambardella (1995),
Scherer (2010)]. The knowledge of a biological or chemical target restricts considerably the screen-
ing process. X-ray crystallography, nuclear magnetic resonance, and sophisticated mathematical
and computational models help scientists to design the molecular structure that is likely to have the
desirable therapeutic effects.
The classical example of rational design is the ulcer drug, Tagamet from GlaxoSmithKline. In
the 1970s, scientists knew that histamine stimulates the production of stomach acid. The problem
was to find the histamine receptor antagonist to suppress the gastric acid. Based on the structure
of histamine, the scientists of GlaxoSmithKline designed and tested about 700 compounds during
10 years before discovering the H2-antagonist Tagamet [Azoulay (2002), Scherer (2010)]. Another
famous example is the antidepressant, Prozac, a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) dis-
covered by Eli Lilly in 1972. Scientists knew that if serotonin, a chemical secreted by the brain, is
absorbed too fast by the nerve cells, depression is triggered. Then, Eli Lilly’s researchers started
4In 1951, IG Farben was split and absorbed by BASF, Bayer, Hoechst, and other firms.
4
to design and screen chemical compounds that slow down the absorption of serotonin in a selec-
tive way to minimize side-effects. Prozac was the first blockbuster of Eli Lilly, partly because it
presented less side-effects than non-serotonin treatments for depression [Gambardella (1995)].
The next technical revolution is the drug discovery by using genetic engineering. In the 1970s,
the advent of biotechnology made the drug discovery process more science-based and dependent
of academic institutions [Gambardella (1992), Zucker et al. (2002), Scherer (2010)]. The discovery
of recombinant DNA (rDNA) and monoclonal antibody (mAb) create unparalleled possibilities to
diagnose and treat diseases. The recombinant DNA technique, the transference of DNA segment
from one organism to another organism, was developed in Stanford and University of California
(San Francisco) in 1973. Important application of the technique includes identification of genes
function and production of substances like recombinant insulin and growth hormone. The mono-
clonal antibody (mAb) technique, clones of a unique parent cell, was developed by University of
Cambridge (UK) in 1975. This “magic bullet”, in the sense that selectively targets a substance or
organism, allowed a more effective treatment of several types of cancer.
It is worth mentioning that government sponsored organizations always have an important role
in drug discovery, especially in biological compounds like vaccine [Trusheim et al. (2010)]. Top re-
search centers in microbiology and immunology like Pasteur Institute in Paris and Koch Institute in
Berlin conferred competitive advantage in vaccines respectively to French firm Sanofi and German
firms. Furthermore, in a sample of Top 19 drugs in terms of therapeutic impact introduced between
1965 to 1992, Cockburn and Henderson (2000) found that: 1) 14 of these drugs were discovered
with essential inputs from public sector; and 2) among the 5 drugs that were discovered without
essential inputs from public sector, 4 drugs were discovered by random screening process.
Other consequence of the biotechnology revolution is the obsolescence of the “chemical capa-
bilities”, that allowed the entrance of small specialized firms in the drug discovery process. With-
out the organizational rigidity and bias toward the old technology, biotech firms started to explore
the new technology opportunities, serving as broker between academic institutions and the con-
solidated pharmaceutical firms [Zucker et al. (2002), Stuart et al. (2007)]. Among thousands of
small specialized firms, only two biotech firms become successful vertically integrated firms Am-
gen and Genzyme [Chandler (2009)]. The incumbents weren’t replaced, because long, costly, risky
clinical trials and distribution network remain barriers to entry [DiMasi et al. (2003), DiMasi and
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Grabowski (2007), Rothaermel (2001)]. Other reason is that several consolidated pharmaceutical
firms also moved fast to integrate the new technologies via research alliances, joint venture, and
M&A [Gambardella (1992), Rothaermel and Deeds (2004), Mittra (2007), Malerba and Orsenigo
(2015)].
In 1980s, German firms, the old leaders, were technologically behind to American firms like
Merck, Pfizer, Eli Lilly, and biotechs. Chandler (2009), Malerba and Orsenigo (2015) speculate
that the main cause was that German academic institutions fell behind in comparison to American
academic institutions. Outside of United States, only Cambridge (UK) rivals to the biotech hubs
in San Francisco Bay and Boston. However, the problem of German firms is not about geographic
spillover, but about strategy. Swiss firms like Novartis and Hoffmann-La Roche developed internally
and acquired externally research capabilities via research alliances, joint venture, and M&A. For
example, Genentech, the first biotech firm and founded by Herbert Boyer, the creator of recombinant
DNA technique, was acquired by Hoffmann-La Roche in 1990. Another example is Chiron the main
competitor of Genentech. Ciba-Geigy (in 1996, this Swiss firm and Sandoz formed Novartis) started
a joint venture with Chiron in 1986 and acquired Chiron 8 years late [Chandler (2009)].
Therefore, we showed how the evolution of drug discovery process shaped the complex land-
scape of biopharmaceutical sector, creating technological opportunities for new entrants and follow-
ers to challenge the incumbents.
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CHAPTER 2
DURATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS: A COMPARISON BETWEEN
FIRMS AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
2.1 Introduction
It is a long process to bring new drugs to the market. Drug development can be divided in three
main stages: discovery of the chemical or biological compound, preclinical studies with animals,
and clinical trials with human beings. The last stage can be divided in four phases: 1) Phase I -
small scale study that tests the safety of the compound; 2) Phase II - small scale study that checks
the efficacy of the compound, and generates enough information to kill the project or to advance
it to further development; 3) Phase III - large scale confirmatory study about the safety and effec-
tiveness of the compound submitted to the regulatory authority for drug approval; and 4) Phase IV
- regulatory authority might require postmarket information about the safety and effectiveness the
compound.
Scholars often conceive drug development as a patent race where winner takes all [Kamien
and Schwartz (1974), Fudenberg et al. (1983), Denicolo (1996)]. However, obtaining a patent is
not the end of the race, but the beginning given the higher attrition rate of each phase of clinical
trial. Neither drug development is a winner takes all game, a patent blocks rivals to use the same
chemical compound to treat a specific condition, but it doesn’t impede other firms to develop supe-
rior treatments with less side effects based on other chemical or biologic compound. Lichtenberg
and Philipson (2002) found that between-patent competition (new patents from brand name firms)
is as fiercely as competition within patents (generic drugs). DiMasi and Paquette (2004) studied
the development history of several drugs and found that almost always at least one follow-on drug
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(“me-too”) was in the clinical trial before the breakthrough drug (“first in class”) was approved in
United States from 1960 to 1998, and that in several cases, the first drug in class was not the first to
start the clinical trial.
Big pharmaceutical firms even buy expensive priority review vouchers to accelerate the drug
approval process. Under Section 529 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act),
US Food and Drug Administration can award priority review vouchers to firms who received a drug
approval for a rare pediatric disease. The voucher reduces the FDA decision from 10 months to
6 months. In August 2015, AbbVie payed $350 million for a voucher from United Therapeutics.
The first voucher issued was bought for $67.5 million by Sanofi from BioMarin Pharmaceutical in
2014. Sanofi, in alliance with Regeneron, were the first to show that PSCK9 inhibitor lowers the
cholesterol. However, Amgen run clinical trials faster for its own PSCK9 drug (Repatha). Whereas
Amgen tracked patients during 12 weeks; Sanofi tracked patients during 24 weeks. Although,
Amgen was the first to finish the clinical trials and to apply for drug approval, Sanofi received
first the drug approval for Praluent, because of the priority review voucher [Winslow and Walker
(2014), Loftus (2015)].
Although the duration of clinical trial is a critical element of drug development race, literature
focuses on cost estimation [DiMasi et al. (1991), DiMasi (2001), DiMasi et al. (2003), DiMasi and
Paquette (2004), Adams and Brantner (2006), DiMasi and Grabowski (2007), Berndt and Cockburn
(2014)] and probability of success of clinical trials [Danzon et al. (2005), Guedj (2005), Arora et al.
(2009)]. Related to the duration of clinical trials, the studies [DiMasi et al. (1991, 2003), Guedj
(2005), DiMasi and Grabowski (2007)] restrict themselves to present descriptive statistics about the
length of phase I, II, and III. The literature also ignores the importance of nonprofit organizations
(NPOs) and phase IV in the clinical trials. However, our data about clinical trials started during
2006 to 2011 indicate that: 1) the principal sponsor of 43% of clinical trials were a university,
hospital, federal agency, or other NPO; 2) among the clinical trials developed with the support of
other organizations, almost half (47%) receives a support of a NPO; and 3) phase IV represents 25%
of clinical trials conducted by NPOs, but only 10% of clinical trials conducted by firms.
This paper aims to fill the gaps in the literature mentioned above. We support the thesis that
firms complete clinical trials in shorter time than NPOs. After controlling for several characteristics
of clinical trials, our OLS baseline estimation indicates that firms complete clinical trials 13, 14,
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16, and 11 months early than NPOs for respectively phases I, II, III, and IV. We also found that
external support by firms doesn’t affect the duration of clinical trials, but the NPOs support delays
clinical trials in 2, 5, 6, and 4 months for respectively phases I, II, III, and IV. The results are robust
for Nearest-Neighbor Matching Estimator (NNME) and for different specifications that control for
unobservable quality of clinical trials (presence or not of data monitoring committee) or disease
variations (363 subclasses).
Our findings support the theoretical prediction of Aghion et al. (2008) that firms have com-
parative advantage in the late-stage research (clinical trials). The intuition is that creative freedom
provided by NPO environment matters more in the early-stage research (discovery phase); but in the
late-stage research (clinical trials), control and direction towards higher economic payoff is more
important. Our findings also contribute to the debate of publicization vs privatization of clinical
trials. Several scholars [Lewis et al. (2007), Baker (2008), Jayadev and Stiglitz (2009)] defend that
clinical trials should be considered as a public good, and consequently public funded. Lewis et al.
(2007) propose:
“ ... to establish an independent testing agency to conduct clinical trials at a national
testing facility, under specified conditions of transparency. Drug companies would no
longer directly compensate scientists for evaluating their own products; instead, scien-
tists would work for the testing agency, which would be supported by funds collected
from taxes upon the pharmaceutical industry and/or from general tax revenue”.
Any policy has different dimensions and trade-offs to be evaluated. If public funded means con-
ducting the clinical trial under a NPOs structure, our study points out for a loss of efficiency in one
dimension: completion timing.
2.2 Literature Review
This literature review aims to summarize the theoretical foundations for our thesis that firms have
comparative advantage in performing clinical trials in comparison to NPO. We also present a short
summary of empirical findings related to the duration and other aspects of clinical trials.
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2.2.1 Theoretical Foundations
Several scholars [Nelson (1959), Merton (1973), Partha and David (1994), Polanyi (2000), Sauer-
mann and Stephan (2013)] have been pointed out that NPOs and firms are organizations with dif-
ferent institutional logics, reward systems, and goals. Specifically, Aghion et al. (2008) modelled
the advantage and disadvantage between research conducted by NPO vs Firm based on the property
rights literature [Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Aghion and Tirole (1994),
Hart (2003)]. Traditionally, the literature justified research conducted by NPO based on spillovers
and appropriability problems of basic research [Nelson (1959), Arrow (1962)].
However, Aghion et al. (2008) defends that creative freedom is the main factor to justify the
comparative advantage of NPO in the early-stage research. The logic is that freedom of pursing
multiple paths of interest is more important in the early-stage research; whereas focus on higher
economic payoff matters more in the late-stage research. In other words, freedom fosters the cre-
ativity of scientists, and consequently, the probability of invention, but the conversion of invention
into innovation depends more on targeted effort towards specific goals. Other argument is that in
the early-stage research, academic freedom decreases the labor cost normalized by the motivation
and effort of scientists; but in the late-stage research, labor cost is a marginal factor compared to the
urgency of finishing the R&D project and realize the potential payoff.
Different from Aghion et al. (2008) that conceive a linear R&D process with distinct and divis-
ible phases, Lacetera (2009) raises the question if a whole R&D project should be performed inside
the firm or outsourced to NPO. Lacetera (2009) argues that outsourcing a R&D project to a NPO
is a credible commitment device that a firm will respect the scientific values of the R&D project
without changing it based on economic considerations about profitability. Lacetera (2009) predicts
that long-term R&D project with higher level of uncertainty is more likely to be performed by a
firm; whereas R&D project with broader applicability is more likely to be outsourced to NPO. The
logic is that if the uncertainty is high, firms want to control the research agenda and direct it to more
certain profitable paths; but if uncertainty is low and the R&D project has broader applicability
(higher economic payoff), firms prefer to cede control to NPO.
By the other hand, Budish et al. (2015) defend that firms underinvest in long-term research
and prefer short-term research. The logic is that due to corporate short-termism and fixed patent
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term, firms has less incentives to invest in R&D projects, in which the lag between patents and
commercialization is longer. It is worth noting that if long-term R&D project of Lacetera (2009) is
interpreted to include early-stage research of Aghion et al. (2008), both models produce opposite
predictions.
2.2.2 Empirical Literature of Clinical Trials
Empirical literature in economics focused mainly on cost estimation [DiMasi et al. (1991), DiMasi
(2001), DiMasi et al. (2003), DiMasi and Paquette (2004), Adams and Brantner (2006), DiMasi
and Grabowski (2007), Berndt and Cockburn (2014)] and probability of success of clinical trials
[Danzon et al. (2005), Guedj (2005), Arora et al. (2009)]. Budish et al. (2015), Isakov et al. (2016)
covered other aspects related to clinical trials described in paragraphs below. Concerned to the
duration of clinical trials, part of the literature [DiMasi et al. (1991, 2003), Abrantes-Metz et al.
(2004), Guedj (2005), DiMasi and Grabowski (2007)] restricts itself to present only descriptive
statistics about the length of phase I, II, and III. The exception is Dranove and Meltzer (1994),
Getz and De Bruin (2000). Dranove and Meltzer (1994) investigated 574 approved drugs from
1950 to 1986, and found that firms and US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) accelerate the
drug development and approval process of important drugs. Getz and De Bruin (2000) interviewed
managers of five companies to assess business practices that speed up the development cycle of
biopharmaceutical industry.
DiMasi et al. (1991, 2003), Guedj (2005), DiMasi and Grabowski (2007) has been estimating
the total capitalized R&D cost of a new drug. The last estimate of DiMasi and Grabowski (2007)
for new chemical and biologic molecule is respectively $1.24 and $1.31 billion. Both values include
opportunity cost and are adjusted for the failure risk. Although DiMasi and Grabowski (2007) esti-
mate the average development time to compute the opportunity cost, nothing else is explored about
the duration of clinical trial. Instead of estimated the cost of drug development, Isakov et al. (2016)
estimated the cost of type I error (the cost of approve an ineffective drug) and type II error (the cost
of not approve an effective drug) based on Bayesian decision framework. Isakov et al. (2016) con-
cluded that FDA standards deviate from the social optimum, that is, FDA demands larger sample
and too conservative threshold of statistical significance for deadly illness, but smaller sample and
lower threshold of statistical significance than the optimum for mildest illness.
11
In a sample of 40 big pharmaceutical firms during 1984-2001, Guedj (2005) investigated the
probability of drug candidates to advance to the next phase of clinical trial. Although Guedj (2005)
focused on the comparison of drug approval rate between internal vs external R&D projects, they
also presented descriptive statistics about the duration of clinical trials. Compared to Guedj (2005),
the duration of clinical trials in our Table 2.2 is somewhat shorter. One explanation is that the sam-
ples and the period analyzed are different. In fact, our analysis of ClinicalTrials.gov data suggests
that clinical trials are getting slightly shorter over time.
Budish et al. (2015) showed that an increase in the patient five-year survival rate decreases the
number of cancer clinical trials, specially for the case of privately financed trials. As Budish et al.
(2015) argue that long survival rate is related to long commercialization lag and preventive cancer
clinical trials, they conclude that firms underinvest in long-term clinical trials (cancer prevention) in
comparison to short-term clinical trials (cancer treatment).
In a sample of 574 approved drugs from 1950 to 1986, Dranove and Meltzer (1994) found that
the timing between patent application and FDA approval is shorter for important drugs. Dranove
and Meltzer (1994) classified the drugs in level of importance based on: 1) citations in medical
textbooks, scientific papers, and patents; 2) approval in major markets like United States, Europe,
and Japan; and 3) sales of top 75 selling drugs in United States from 1960 to 1990.
In a sample of 109 firms and 725 NCEs (new chemical entity) approved during 1981 to 1999,
Getz and De Bruin (2000) calculated that the average drug development time was 12.2 years for the
firm bottom quartile, 5.6 years for the firm median quartile, and 2.7 years for the firm top quartile.
These figures cannot be interpreted as evidence of higher performance of the firms in the top quartile,
because no control was employed, and the comparison was made among firms with different disease
portfolio. Getz and De Bruin (2000) pointed out that firms in the top quartile have superior business
practice, such as: global project planning, realistic protocols, active collaboration with regulatory
authorities, adoption of modern information technology (IT), and project team empowerment.
2.3 Hypothesis
Modelling the trade-off between research developed by firms vs nonprofit organizations (NPOs),
Aghion et al. (2008) argue that the innovation process is more efficient, when the early-stage re-
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search is conducted by a NPOs and the late-stage research by a firm. The logic of this labor division
is that in the early-stage research, the creative freedom supported by NPO environment increases
the effort and motivation of scientists and in the same time decreases its wages; whereas in the
late-stage research, control and direction towards higher economic payoff is more important.
Biopharmaceutical sector is a perfect place to test the theoretical predictions of Aghion et al.
(2008), because R&D process of this industry can be decomposed in distinct phases with clear reg-
ulatory milestone. Other characteristic of this industry is that patent application occurs far advanced
from drug commercialization usually before the preclinical phase. Inevitably substantial part of
patent fix term protection of 20 years in US is lost due to the clinical trial period. Minimize the
timing gap between drug discovery and commercialization is critical to preserve patent rent and it is
aligned with the goal of profit maximization, but not necessary aligned with scientific ethos [Nelson
(1959), Merton (1973), Partha and David (1994), Polanyi (2000), Sauermann and Stephan (2013)].
Labor cost is a critical component of clinical trials. NIH (2015) reported that NIH Clinical Cen-
ter budget for fiscal year 2014 was $402 millions, and about $251 millions (62% of total budget)
was destined to cover the labor cost. Stern (2004) showed that post-Ph.D. biologists accept substan-
tial lower salary in exchange of freedom to pursue their own research interest and ability to publish
the results. If by one side, NPOs have labor cost advantage in the early-stage research; by other
side, labor cost might be less important in the late-stage research. For example, closer to get a drug
blockbuster, the wage of scientists represents a smaller percentage of the expected economic payoff
of finishing the R&D project.
Furthermore, several tasks related to the clinical trials are closer to regular business tasks than
academic research. Advertising effort in recruiting subjects and data management (monitoring and
recording data) are considered less glamorous activity than research at drug discovery phase. Getz
and De Bruin (2000), Drennan (2002), Fleischhacker et al. (2015) point out that the main practical
problem of clinical trials is to recruit subjects. In some cases, organizations might compete fiercely
for patients. The average American often demands monetary compensation for participating in
the clinical trials, and are not inclined to give the written consent after being informed about the
risks of enrolling in it. NPOs are more likely to be restricted to a specific geographic location;
whereas firms have more flexibility to conduct clinical trials in other countries or to rely on CROs
(Contract Research Organizations) for recruitment and related tasks [Dranove and Meltzer (1994),
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Getz and De Bruin (2000), Mirowski and Van Horn (2005)]. Drennan (2002) affirms that CROs
pay the doctors for recruiting patients. According with our descriptive statistics of section 2.4,
firms conduct on average more clinical trials in different countries with larger sample than NPOs,
suggesting some efficiencies in recruiting process.
Therefore, in comparison to NPOs, firms might be more flexible and have more mechanisms
to accelerate projects with higher expected payoff, including paying higher salaries, hiring more
scientists, and outsource tasks to CROs. We hypothesize that firms are more efficient in managing
clinical trials than NPOs, consequently the duration of clinical trials conducted by firms is shorter
than by NPOs:
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, firms complete clinical trials in shorter time than NPOs.
Azoulay (2003), Mirowski and Van Horn (2005) point out that firms started since 1980s to replace
the academic cooperation by CROs, specially for clinical trial tasks. CROs often advertise their
services as cheaper than NPOs. Mirowski and Van Horn (2005) enumerate some advantages of
CROs such as: custom-made information technologies, capacity to screen a large pool of subjects
in different sites, and independent IRB (Institutional Review Board). The National Research Act of
1974 mandates that every organization that receives federal funding must have a IRB to monitor the
clinical trials with human beings. Originally, almost all IRB was localized in NPOs, in particular
universities. However, the FDA allowed the use of independent IRB in 1981. This explain why
the clinical trials conducted by NPOs is more likely to have an external data monitoring committee
than clinical trials conducted by firms. Mirowski and Van Horn (2005) argue that the IRB of NPOs
views the clinical trial as a small-scale and geographically isolated procedure conducted by a lonely
scientist; whereas the independent IRB of CROs has a more practical view of clinical trials in terms
of cost and timing. Azoulay (2003) points out that CROs are Taylorist organizations focus on narrow
and specific tasks; whereas Pharmaceutical and Biotechs firms are functional flexible organizations
with high paid and skilled labor. Azoulay (2003) defends that modern clinical trial is a set of
complex tasks, and it is completely inefficient in terms of quality to outsource the coordination of
clinical trials to CROs. Azoulay (2003) argues that workers of CROs are poor paid and trained,
and unable to capture tacit knowledge or soft data from clinical trials. In fact, firms outsource less
important tasks or R&D projects to CROs, and keep the important clinical trials (higher expected
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value, for example potential blockbuster) to in-house team.
At first, we could expect that any kind of external collaboration would speed up the clinical
trials. However, differently from the discovery phase characterized by an open-ended problem
with multiple paths, clinical trials are more like closed-end problems with well-delimited protocol
with clear goals. Given these differences, cooperation among organizations in clinical trials might
involve duplicity of effort and resources. Even a small organization might have enough scale to run
a clinical trial without any external support. Neither theoretically or empirically it is clear, if the
benefits of cooperation overcome the cost of cooperation. For example, some authors [Danzon et al.
(2005), Arora et al. (2009)] claim that alliance in the discovery phase increases the probability of
drug approval; whereas others claim the opposite [Pisano (1997), Guedj (2005)]. By the arguments
above, if NPOs are less efficient in conducting clinical trials than firms, probably NPO external
support is more likely to delay clinical trials than the firm external support.
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, relative to firm external support, NPO external support delays the
completion of clinical trials.
2.4 Data
The main database is the Aggregate Analysis of ClinicalTrials.gov (AACT) compiled by the Clin-
ical Trials Transformation Initiative (CTTI). The CTTI is a public-private partnership composed
by FDA, National Institutes of Health (NIH), pharmaceutical and biotech firms, academic institu-
tions, patient advocacy groups, and other organizations, that aims to promote the “best practices”
related to clinical trials. ClinicalTrials.gov is a website maintained by the U.S. National Library of
Medicine (NLM) at the NIH. We use the AACT relational database instead of raw data available
on ClinicalTrials.gov website, because the AACT database contains extra information about clin-
ical trials not available on ClinicalTrials.gov website, such as: classification of principal sponsor
and collaborators of clinical trials, secondary location of clinical trials, presence or not of (DMC),
description about potential conflict of interest related to the publication of the results, and etc.
Other database used in this study is the Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) thesaurus from U.S.
National Library of Medicine (NLM). As the MeSH thesaurus revises and updates continually the
medical terms, it is worth mentioning that the file 2017 MeSH Tree Hierarchy was downloaded from
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NLM website on 10/23/2016. Based on MeSH thesaurus, we classify the diseases of the clinical
trials in 30 classes and 363 subclasses similar to the first level and second level of the Anatomical
Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) Classification System published by the World Health Organization
(WHO).
The historic probability of drug approval was extracted from PharmaProjects, a database from
Citeline. This organization claims to be the world’s most comprehensive source of real-time R&D
intelligence for the pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaprojects tracks drugs pipeline since 1980, cov-
ering all stages of drug development from discovery through clinical trials to drug approval.
Although the AACT database reflects the data from ClinicalTrials.gov until March 27, 2016, the
sample was restricted to the clinical trials started during 2006 to 2011. The International Committee
of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) established that clinical trials initiated after July 1, 2005, must
be registered in the ClinicalTrials.gov website to be considered for publication. The Food and
Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) requires that clinical trials from phase II to IV in
U.S. site started after September 27, 2007, or with a completion date later than 12/25/2007 to be
registered in the ClinicalTrials.gov. Following the CTTI (2016) cautionary advice that “studies that
began before the ICMJE requirement in July 2005 are less likely to be registered, especially if their
results are unpublished (e.g., negative studies)”, and the substantial increasing in the registration
of clinical trials in the ClinicalTrials.gov website during the 2002 to 2005, we decided to exclude
the clinical trials started before 2006. For the same reason of avoiding potential bias in the sample,
we also decided to exclude clinical trials started after 2012. Without this exclusion, we would
underestimate the duration of clinical trials in the sample, because the short duration clinical trials
would be overrepresented and the long duration clinical trials would be underrepresented in the
sample.
Furthermore, only completed or terminated clinical trial that test chemical or biological com-
pound entered in the sample, that is, ongoing study, surgery, devices, psychotherapy, dietary sup-
plement, and etc, were excluded from the sample. We also excluded clinical trials, in which the
primary purpose is educational, counseling, training, supportive care (maximize comfort instead of
cure a disease), and health services research (processes, management, organization or financing of
health care), because the focus of this study is in protocols designed to use chemical or biological
compounds to treat, prevent, diagnose, or screen diseases.
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In summary, our final sample is composed by 20,839 clinical trials started during 2006 to 2011
distributed in phases I, II, III, and IV, and conducted by 1,380 firms and 1,787 NPOs.
2.4.1 Variable Definitions
2.4.1.1 Dependent Variable
“Duration”. The dependent variable “Duration” measured by months is equal the “Study Comple-
tion Date” minus the “Study Start Date”. The “Study Start Date” is the date when the enrollment
to the protocol starts. The “Study Completion Date” is the final date of data collection. This mea-
sure excludes the duration of FDA’s drug review, allowing a direct comparison between NPOs and
Firms concerned the duration of clinical trials. The results of this study remain the same if natural
logarithm of “Duration” is used.
2.4.1.2 Independent Variables
“Firm Principal Sponsor”. The main independent variable “Firm Principal Sponsor” is equal to 1,
if the principal sponsor of the clinical trial is a firm, and 0 if the principal sponsor of the clinical
trial is a NPO. Principal sponsor is defined in US Public Law 110-85, Title VIII, Section 801, as the
primary organization responsible for the implementation and data analysis of the clinical trial.
“Firm Collaborator”. This variable is equal to 1, if the clinical trial has at least one firm collab-
orator, and 0 otherwise.
“NPO Collaborator”. This variable is equal to 1, if the clinical trial has at least one NPO
collaborator, and 0 otherwise.
“Firm # of CTs”. The variable “Firm Principal Sponsor = 1” was split in three dummies vari-
ables based on the number of clinical trials in a specific development phase. One dummy for firms
below the median (< 50th perc.). A second dummy for firms between the second and third quartile
(50th to 75th). A third dummy for firms above the third quartile (> 75th perc).
“NPO # of CTs”. The variable “Firm Principal Sponsor = 0” was broken in three dummies
variables based on the number of clinical trials in a specific development phase. One dummy for
NPOs below the median (< 50th perc.). A second dummy for NPOs between the second and third
quartile (50th to 75th). A third dummy for NPOs above the third quartile (> 75th perc).
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“PS.Firm”. The variable “Firm Principal Sponsor = 1” was split in four dummies based on
cooperation with other organization. One dummy “PS.Firm (Single)” for clinical trials developed
by a firm principal sponsor without any cooperation. A second dummy “PS.Firm with Firm” for
clinical trials developed by a firm principal sponsor with external cooperation of other firm. A third
dummy “PS.Firm with NPO” for clinical trials developed by a firm principal sponsor with external
cooperation of a NPO. A fourth dummy “PS.Firm with Firm & NPO” for clinical trials developed
by a firm principal sponsor with external cooperation of a firm and NPO.
“PS.NPO”. The variable “Firm Principal Sponsor = 1” was split in four dummies based on co-
operation with other organization. One dummy “PS.NPO (Single)” for clinical trials developed by a
firm principal sponsor without any cooperation. A second dummy “PS.NPO with Firm” for clinical
trials developed by a NPO principal sponsor with external cooperation of a firm. A third dummy
“PS.NPO with NPO” for clinical trials developed by a NPO principal sponsor with external cooper-
ation of other NPO. A fourth dummy “PS.NPO with Firm & NPO” for clinical trials developed by
a firm principal sponsor with external cooperation of a firm and NPO.
2.4.1.3 Control Variables
“Data Monitoring Committee”. This variable is equal to 1, if the clinical trial has data monitoring
committee, and 0 otherwise. Data monitoring committee is an independent group of experts who
reviews the ongoing data from clinical trials and advises the principal sponsor about the safety and
efficacy of the intervention.
“Biological Compound”. This variable is equal to 1, if the compound is biological, and 0 if the
compound is chemical.
“# of CTs per Year”. It is the number of clinical trials (all phases) per year at organization level.
“Ln(Enrollment)”. It is the natural logarithm of the number of subjects in the trial.
“# of Countries”. It is the number of different countries that hosted the clinical trial.
“Prob. of Success”. It is the historic probability of drug approval. First, we calculate the prob-
ability of drug approval from 1989 to 2005 for 14 ATC level 1: ATC_A (Alimentary tract and
metabolism), ATC_B (Blood and blood forming organs), ATC_C (Cardiovascular system), ATC_D
(Dermatologicals), ATC_G (Genito-urinary system and sex hormones), ATC_H (Systemic hor-
monal preparations), ATC_J (Antiinfectives for systemic use), ATC_L (Antineoplastic and im-
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munomodulating agents), ATC_M (Musculo-skeletal system), ATC_N (Nervous system), ATC_P
(Antiparasitic products), ATC_R (Respiratory system), ATC_S (Sensory organs), and ATC_V (Var-
ious). Second, we compute the mean among the ATC1, in which the drug is classified.
“Phase I and Phase II”. This variable is equal to 1, if phase I and phase II of the clinical trial are
occurring in the same time under the same protocol, and 0 otherwise.
“Phase II and Phase III”. This variable is equal to 1, if phase II and phase III of the clinical trial
are occurring in the same time under the same protocol, and 0 otherwise.
“CT Goals”. It is a set of dummy variables that captures the main goal of the clinical trial: 1)
“Basic Science, 2) “Diagnostic”, 3) “Screening”, 4) “Prevention”, and 5) “Treatment”. The first
is a protocol designed to investigate, for example the physiological or biomechanical mechanism
of action of the compound in the human body. The second is a protocol designed to establish the
presence of a disease. The third protocol aims to identify risk factors in large numbers of seemingly
healthy people. The fourth protocol evaluates how a specific intervention prevents the development
of a disease. The fifth is a protocol designed to assess how a specific intervention treat a disease.
“CT Design”. It is composed by a set of variables related to the design of clinical trials: 1)
“Minimum Age” - minimum age of participants measured in years; 2) “Maximum Age” - maxi-
mum age of participants measured in years; 3) “Male” - coded as 1, if only males are recruited,
and 0 otherwise; 4) “Female” - coded as 1 if only females are recruited, and 0 otherwise; 5) “Male
and Female” - coded as 1 if both males and females are recruited, 0 otherwise; 6) “Randomized” -
coded as 1, if the participants are assigned to intervention groups at random, and 0 otherwise; 7) “#
Intervention” - total number of interventions (biological, chemical, behavioral, device, dietary sup-
plement, radiation, and etc); 8) “Open Label” - coded as 1, if no masking is used, and 0 otherwise;
9) “Single Blind” - coded as 1, if one party (the investigator or participant) is uninformed about
the intervention assignment, and 0 otherwise; 10) “Double Blind” - coded as 1, if both parties are
uninformed about the intervention assignment, and 0 otherwise; 11) “Single Group” - coded as 1, if
it is single arm clinical trial, and 0 otherwise; 12) “Parallel” - coded as 1, if participants are assigned
in parallel to one of two or more groups for the duration of the clinical trial, and 0 otherwise; 13)
“Cross-over” - coded as 1, if participants switch between alternative interventions during the clini-
cal trial, and 0 otherwise; 14) “Factorial” - coded as 1, if two or more interventions are evaluated in
parallel against a control group, and 0 otherwise; 15) “Terminated” - coded as 1, if the clinical trial
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finished prematurely the recruiting of participants, and 0 otherwise.
“CT Endpoint”. It is a set of dummy variables that captures what outcome the protocol is
designed to assess: 1) “Safety”, 2) “Efficacy”, 3) “Safety and Efficacy”, 4) “Bio-equivalence”,
5) “Bio-availability”, 6) “Pharmacokinetics”, 7) “Pharmacodynamics”, 8) “Pharmacokinetics and
Pharmacodynamics”. The first endpoint examines how safe is the compound. The second endpoint
quantifies the efficacy of the compound in healing the disease. The third endpoint is the combination
of both first and second endpoints. The fourth endpoint checks if the generic compound is equivalent
for all intents and purposes to the brand name compound. The fifth endpoint measures the rate and
extent of the compound absorption. The sixth endpoint evaluates how the organism affects the
compound over time in terms of absorption, distribution, biotransformation, and excretion. The
seventh endpoint evaluates how the compound affects the organism over time in terms of intensity
of therapeutic properties and adverse effects. The eighth endpoint is the combination of both seventh
and sixth endpoints.
“Top 20 Countries”. It is a set of dummy variables for 20 countries with the highest number
of clinical trials in the sample. Following the countries in increasing order of number of clinical
trials: Japan, Sweden, Taiwan, Switzerland, Poland, Brazil, Australia, Denmark, Israel, Belgium,
Netherlands, South Korea, China, Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, and
United States.
“Disease (30 classes)”. It is a set of dummy variables for 30 classes of disease. The classes are:
C01 - Bacterial Infections and Mycoses, C02 - Virus Diseases, C03 - Parasitic Diseases, C04 - Neo-
plasms, C05 - Musculoskeletal Diseases, C06 - Digestive System Diseases, C07 - Stomatognathic
Diseases, C08 - Respiratory Tract Diseases, C09 - Otorhinolaryngologic Diseases, C10 - Nervous
System Diseases, C11 - Eye Diseases, C12 - Male Urogenital Diseases, C13 - Female Urogenital
Diseases and Pregnancy Complications, C14 - Cardiovascular Diseases, C15 - Hemic and Lym-
phatic Diseases, C16 - Congenital, Hereditary, and Neonatal Diseases and Abnormalities, C17 -
Skin and Connective Tissue Diseases, C18 - Nutritional and Metabolic Diseases, C19 - Endocrine
System Diseases, C20 - Immune System Diseases, C21 - Disorders of Environmental Origin, C22
- Animal Diseases, C23 - Pathological Conditions, Signs and Symptoms, C24 - Occupational Dis-
eases, C25 - Chemically-Induced Disorders, C26 - Wounds and Injuries, F01 - Behavior and Be-
havior Mechanisms, F02 - Psychological Phenomena and Processes, F03 - Mental Disorders, F04 -
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Behavioral Disciplines and Activities.
“Disease (363 subclasses)”. It is a set of dummy variables for 363 subclasses of disease. Given
the space restriction, some examples of subclasses will be provided, but all subclasses can be find in
the MeSH thesaurus website. In the class C02 - Virus Diseases, one subclass is C02_440 - Hepatitis,
Viral, Human. In the class C19 - Endocrine System Diseases, one subclass is C19_246 - Diabetes
Mellitus. In the class C22 - Animal Diseases, one subclass is C22_812 - Salmonella Infections.
“Year”. It is a set of dummy variables for each starting year of clinical trials from 2006 to 2011.
2.4.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of whole sample and the sample broken in principal spon-
sor NPOs and principal sponsor firm. Related to clinical trials conducted primary by NPOs, the
average duration is 37 months, 26% receive external support by a firm, 15% receive external sup-
port by other NPOs, 58% have data monitoring committee, a typical NPO started on average 8
clinical trials per year during 2006 to 2011, on average 41 people enrolled per clinical trial, 6% of
clinical trials are a combination of phase I and II, and 3% of clinical trials are a combination of phase
II and III. Related to clinical trials conducted primary by firms, the average duration is 22 months,
10% receive external support by other firm, 4% receive external support by a NPO, 30% have data
monitoring committee, a typical firm started on average 48 clinical trials per year during 2006 to
2011, on average 103 people enrolled per clinical trial, 4% of clinical trials are a combination of
phase I and II, and 2% of clinical trials are a combination of phase II and III. Only the proportion of
biological compound (11% to 13%) and the probability of drug approval (5.7% to 5.9%) are similar
between NPOs and firms.
Figure 2.1 presents the proportion of clinical trials by organization and external cooperation.
The most part of clinical trials has a firm as principal sponsor, except phase IV, in which NPOs as
principal sponsor conduct more than 60% of clinical trials. It is also worth noting that the proportion
of clinical trials conducted by firms as principal sponsor has been increasing during 2006 to 2011,
except for phase IV. For all phases, about 20% of clinical trials has the external support by a firm or
NPO, and this proportion shows a slightly decline over 2006 to 2011.
Table 2.2 presents the duration of clinical trials by phase. For each phase, firms complete the




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
Phase IV
Proportion of Clinical Trials
Firm Principal Sponsor NPO Principal Sponsor
Firm Collaborator NPO Collaborator
Figure 2.1: Proportion of Clinical Trials by Organization and External Cooperation
Phase I has the highest mean difference (20 months), but this difference has to be interpreted with
caution. Firms are less likely to report the results of phase I, specially if the compound doesn’t
meet the safety standard. Compared to firms, NPOs are more likely to report the results of phase I,
specially if they receive public funding. The mean difference of phase II is 19 months. A number
relatively high if compared to the mean difference of combined clinical trials of phases I and II
(12 months), and combined clinical trials of phases II and III (9 months). The mean difference
of phase III is 13 months. In both phase II and III, the goal is to prove the effectiveness of the
compound for a particular disease. The difference is that phase III demands a big trial (higher
number of enrollments) and additional information about the risk-benefit of the compound. One
explanation for lower mean difference of phase III in comparison to phase I and II is that optimizing
the protocol of phase III involves higher risk in terms of receiving drug approval than optimizing
the duration of tasks and procedures of phase I and II. Phase IV has the lowest mean difference
(8 months). The goal of phase IV is to obtain extra information about compound’s side effects,
benefits, and optimal use. Almost always, clinical trials, that aims to identify uncommon adverse
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Table 2.2: Duration of Clinical Trials by Phase (Measured in Months)
Principal Sponsor NPO Principal Sponsor Firm
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Phase I 1258 37.32 (22.09) 2352 17.49 (17.73)
Phase I and Phase II 700 40.14 (23.01) 518 28.41 (19.62)
Phase II 3163 41.34 (21.71) 3980 22.69 (17.15)
Phase II and Phase III 369 35.95 (20.19) 203 26.16 (16.51)
Phase III 1188 37.50 (22.12) 3583 24.91 (17.57)
Phase IV 2232 30.60 (18.66) 1293 22.04 (16.23)
Total 8910 37.25 (21.56) 11929 22.57 (17.64)
effects in special populations, are relegate to phase IV [Juni et al. (2001), Friedman et al. (2015)].
It is worth noting that firms have less incentives to optimize the duration and carry out clinical trials
after the FDA drug approval. Phase IV represents only 10% of clinical trials conducted by firms,
but 25% of clinical trials conducted by NPOs. Firms appear to focus on phases II and III; whereas
NPOs appear to focus on phase II and IV.
Table 2.3 presents the duration of clinical trials by organization and external cooperation. The
categories “PS.Firm (Single)”, “PS.Firm with Firm”, “PS.Firm with NPO”, “PS.Firm with Firm &
NPO”, “PS.NPO (Single)”, “PS.NPO with Firm”, “PS.NPO with NPO”, and “PS.NPO with Firm &
NPO” are mutually exclusive. Overall, for each phase: 1) firm principal sponsor completes clinical
trials early than NPO principal sponsor; 2) firm principal sponsor without any external support
completes clinical trials early than other categories; 3) any kind of external cooperation (firm, NPO,
and both) appears to delay the clinical trials in comparison with the situation of single development,
or there is not statistically significance difference between cooperation and not cooperation.
Table 2.4 presents the correlation matrix of main variables used in the regressions of Tables 2.5,
2.6, 2.7, and 2.8. Overall, the sign of the variables is aligned to the hypothesis of section 2.3 and
results of section 2.6.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
The goal of the empirical strategy is to identify the causal impact of the variable “Firm Principal
Sponsor” on the duration of clinical trials. The data was not originated by a randomized experiment.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































publication of results, and economic importance, the sample of phase III is likely to be representative
of the population. Other phases are more likely to suffer from sampling bias. Specially for phase I,
some studies with undesirable results conducted by small organizations might not be registered in
the ClinicalTrials.gov website. Therefore, the results of this paper are more reliable for phase III,
and causal impact has to be interpreted as holding all other factors constant.
We propose the following model:
y = αD + x
′
β + u (2.1)
where y is the duration of clinical trial, D is the dummy variable “Firm Principal Sponsor”, x′ is
the vector of control variables, and u is error term. In order to estimate the coefficients α and β,
we assume that y0 (outcome for the non-treated group) and y1(outcome for the treated group) are ⊥
(independent) of D conditional to the control variables x:
y0, y1 ⊥ D|x (2.2)
Equation 2.2 implies that although the data is not originated by an experimental setting, the
problem of confounding factors or selection bias can be eliminated once x is included in the regres-
sion. Then, equation 2.1 can be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), clustering the robust
standard errors at organization level (firms and NPOs).
To the best of our knowledge, this study has the most comprehensive list of control variables.
The ideal clinical trial has two characteristics: randomized and double-blind. In order to control
for the quality of clinical trials [Juni et al. (2001), Friedman et al. (2015)], we have the variables
“Randomized”, “Open Label”, “Single Blind”, “Double Blind”, and “Data Monitoring Committee”.
Medical literature [Fleming and DeMets (1996), Johnson et al. (2003), Wagner et al. (2007)] points
outs that duration and rate of success of clinical trials are very sensitive to the clinical endpoint or
surrogates. Unfortunately, we don’t control for a specific endpoint as survival rate, or surrogates
as tumor shrinkage, cholesterol levels, and blood pressure, but we control for general categories of
endpoints with the variables: “Safety”, “Efficacy”, “Bio-equivalence”, “Bio-availability”, “Pharma-
cokinetics”, “Pharmacodynamics” and interactions of previous variables. Budish et al. (2015) also
point out that firms prefer to develop late-stage cancer drugs than cancer prevention drugs, because
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the first has higher expected payoff and can be brought to the market faster; whereas the second
involves longer clinical trials and higher discount factor. We control for these factors with the vari-
ables: “Prevention” and “Treatment”. Isakov et al. (2016) suggest that for terminal diseases, FDA
is too conservative with drug approval requirements; but for less deadly illnesses, FDA is too risk-
tolerant. As clinical trials conducted in different countries are subject to different regulations and
standards, we control for this variation with dummies for “Top 20 Countries” in terms of quantity
of clinical trials. Furthermore, we control for disease variation (“30 classes” and “363 subclasses”),
and potential shocks over the years (“Year”).
Therefore, we estimate the following equation:
Durationcody = α1Firm_Principal_Sponsorcody + α2Firm_Collaboratorcody
+α3NPO_Collaboratorcody + x
′
codyβ + κc + δd + γy + ucody (2.3)
The dependent variable, Durationcody, is the duration of clinical trial c, conducted by organi-
zation o, targeting disease d, starting in the year y. The main independent variable is the dummy
variable “Firm Principal Sponsor”. The secondary independent variables are the dummy variables
for “Firm Collaborator” and “NPO Collaborator”. Variables for clinical trial goals, design, and
endpoint are represented by κc, dummies for specific diseases (30 classes or 363 subclasses) are
represented by δd, and dummies for starting year of clinical trials are represented by γy.
For robustness check, we estimate α1 using the Nearest-Neighbor Matching estimator (NNME)
with robust standard errors derived by Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2012). Nearest-Neighbor Match-
ing is a nonparametric estimator that imposes minimal functional form and exclusion restriction
for identification, but requires bigger sample size than OLS. According with Cameron and Trivedi
(2005), the main advantage of the matching estimator in comparison to OLS is to relax the assump-
tion that the variable of interest D enters the conditional mean function linearly.
In addition to assumption 2 that is critical to identify the population-average treatment effect on
the treated (ATET), we assume the overlap assumption:
Pr[D = 1|x] < 1 (2.4)
Equation 2.4 guarantees that for each clinical trial conducted by a firm, there is another clinical
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trial conducted by NPO with similar x. As only y0i or y1i is observed, but not both in the same
time for an organization i, the matching estimator estimates the missing potential outcome based
on the outcomes of the “nearest neighbors”. In other words, the NNME imputes the missing values
by matching firms and NPOs that are most similar based on the vector of control variables x. To
calculate the distance between xi and xj , Mahalanobis distance, a weight that uses the inverse of
the covariates’ variance–covariance matrix, is employed [Bloom et al. (2013)]. The results remain
the same if inverse variance or Euclidean metric is used.
Related to the number of matches per observation, there is a trade off between bias and variance
[Cameron and Trivedi (2005)]. Although higher number of matches per observation decreases the
variance, we decided for only one match per observation to minimize the probability of inferior
match. Instead of using propensity score, we also decided to match on the regressors, because only
few variables in x are continuous. In the presence of continuous variables, the NNME estimator
is biased even in large samples [Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2012)]. Therefore, we corrected for
bias based on Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2012), using a specific linear function of the continuous
variables: “Ln(Enrollment)”, “Minimum Age”, “Maximum Age”, and “Prob. of Success”.
For additional robustness check, we also estimate the impact of “Firm Principal Sponsor” on
clinical trial hazard rate (completion of clinical trial), using the Cox proportional hazard model with
robust standard errors clustered by organizations. Cox model is a semiparametric method [Cox
(1972), Wooldridge (2010)]. The proportional hazard is composed by a baseline hazard common to
all clinical trials λ0(t) that is function of time t, and individual hazard functions µ(xβ) that differ
proportionately based on regressors x and vector of parameters β:
λ(t;xβ) = µ(xβ)λ0(t) (2.5)
Cox model is appropriate, when the regressors are time-invariant, and someone is interested in
how the regressors shift the hazard function [Wooldridge (2010)]. The advantage of Cox model is
that the hazard ratios of the covariates can be estimated very generally without strict assumptions
about λ0(t). Cox (1972) derived the partial maximum likelihood estimator for β without the need
to estimate λ0(t).
Therefore, we investigate the impact of the variable “Firm Principal Sponsor” on the duration
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of clinical trials, using the OLS as baseline approach and two other methods for robustness check.
2.6 Result
Table 2.5 presents the OLS estimation of duration of phase I. Overall, the results support H1, as
the coefficient of “Firm Principal Sponsor” is negative and statistically significant at 1% level in
the models 1, 2 and 5. Controlling for several factors, the baseline model 2 estimates that clinical
trials conducted by firms finish 13 months early than clinical trials conducted by NPO. This result
persists in model 3, as the coefficients of “Firm # of CTs (< 50th perc.)”, “Firm # of CTs (50th to
75th)”, and “Firm # of CTs (> 75th perc.)” are negative and statistically significant at 1% level.
As the three coefficients have similar magnitude, we infer that previous results were not driven by
firm size or experience in clinical trials. By the other hand, medium (50th to 75th) and bigger (>
75th perc.) NPOs with more experience take about additional 4 months to finish a clinical trial in
comparison to smaller NPO with less experience (< 50th perc.). It looks that bureaucracy related to
size affects more the NPOs than firms. Concerned H2, there is empirical evidence that an external
NPO collaboration delays the clinical trials, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant
coefficient of “NPO Collaborator” at 1% level in the models 2, 3 and 5. According with baseline
model 2, external NPO collaboration delays the clinical trial in 2 months. However, external firm
collaboration has no effect on the duration of clinical trials as indicated by the non-statistically
significant coefficient of “Firm Collaborator” in the models 2, 3, and 5. Model 4 does not support
the relative efficiency of external firm collaboration in comparison to external NPO collaboration.
Wald tests indicate that: I) “PS.Firm with Firm” is not statistically different than “PS.Firm with
NPO” at 10% level; and II) “PS.NPO with Firm” is not statistically different than “PS.NPO with
NPO” at 10% level. Furthermore, “PS.Firm with Firm & NPO” and “PS.NPO with Firm & NPO”
have the same impact on the duration of the clinical trials as respectively “PS.Firm (Single)” and
“PS.NPO (Single)”. For robustness checks, model 5 confirms the results of previous model, but with
slightly lower magnitude of the coefficients due to additional control variables (“Data Monitoring
Committee” and “363 diseases subclasses”) that remove part of variation.
Table 2.6 presents the OLS estimation of duration of phase II. Overall, the results support H1, as
the coefficient of “Firm Principal Sponsor” is negative and statistically significant at 1% level in the
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Table 2.5: OLS Estimation of Duration of Phase I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm Principal Sponsor -16.59∗∗∗ -13.25∗∗∗ -11.70∗∗∗
(1.17) (1.21) (1.12)
Firm Collaborator 0.73 0.66 1.13
(1.09) (1.09) (1.08)
NPO Collaborator 2.21∗ 2.36∗∗ 2.16∗∗
(1.19) (1.07) (1.09)
Firm # of CTs (< 50th perc.) -11.42∗∗∗
(1.12)
Firm # of CTs (50th to 75th) -9.30∗∗∗
(1.99)
Firm # of CTs (> 75th perc.) -10.43∗∗∗
(2.43)
NPO # of CTs (50th to 75th) 4.97∗∗
(2.06)




PS.Firm with Firm -12.78∗∗∗
(1.91)
PS.Firm with NPO -10.59∗∗∗
(2.15)
PS.Firm with Firm & NPO -12.81∗∗∗
(3.66)
PS.NPO with Firm 2.74
(2.16)
PS.NPO with NPO 3.24∗
(1.85)
PS.NPO with Firm & NPO 1.88
(3.05)
Data Monitoring Committee 2.42∗∗∗
(0.85)
Biological Compound 4.26∗∗∗ 4.12∗∗∗ 4.30∗∗∗ 4.55∗∗∗
(1.11) (1.11) (1.11) (1.30)
# of CTs per Year -0.01∗∗ -0.02 -0.01∗∗ -0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(Enrollment) 3.77∗∗∗ 3.84∗∗∗ 3.78∗∗∗ 3.79∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.41)
Prob. of Success -0.51 -0.46 -0.46 -1.15∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.36) (0.39) (0.39)
Phase I and Phase II 2.41∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗ 2.43∗∗∗ 3.10∗∗∗
(0.86) (0.85) (0.86) (0.99)
CT Goals No Yes Yes Yes Yes
CT Design No Yes Yes Yes Yes
CT Endpoint No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Top 20 Countries (# of CTs) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease (30 classes) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Disease (363 subclasses) No No No No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.40 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.51
Observations 4828 3031 3031 3031 2507
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered by organizations).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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models 1, 2 and 5. Controlling for several factors, the baseline model 2 estimates that clinical trials
conducted by firms finish 14 months early than clinical trials conducted by NPO. This result persists
in model 3, as the coefficients of “Firm # of CTs (< 50th perc.)”, “Firm # of CTs (50th to 75th)”,
and “Firm # of CTs (> 75th perc.)” are negative and statistically significant at 1% level. As the
three coefficients have similar magnitude, we infer that previous results were not driven by firm size
or experience in clinical trials. By the other hand, medium (50th to 75th) and bigger (> 75th perc.)
NPOs with more experience take respectively additional 3 and 4 months to finish a clinical trial in
comparison to smaller NPO with less experience (< 50th perc.). It looks that bureaucracy related to
size affects more the NPOs than firms. Concerned H2, there is empirical evidence that an external
NPO collaboration delays the clinical trials, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant
coefficient of “NPO Collaborator” at 1% level in the models 2, 3 and 5. According with baseline
model 2, external NPO collaboration delays the clinical trial in 5 months. However, external firm
collaboration has no effect on the duration of clinical trials as indicated by the non-statistically
significant coefficient of “Firm Collaborator” in the models 2, 3, and 5. Model 4 supports the
relative efficiency of external firm collaboration in comparison to external NPO collaboration. Wald
tests indicate that: I) “PS.Firm with Firm” is statistically different than “PS.Firm with NPO” at 1%
level; and II) “PS.NPO with Firm” is statistically different than “PS.NPO with NPO” at 1% level.
Furthermore, combined cooperation (firm and NPO) speeds up the clinical trials in comparison to
single NPO cooperation. For robustness checks, model 5 confirms the results of previous model,
but with slightly lower magnitude of the coefficients due to additional control variables (“Data
Monitoring Committee” and “363 diseases subclasses”) that remove part of variation.
Table 2.7 presents the OLS estimation of duration of phase III. Overall, the results support H1, as
the coefficient of “Firm Principal Sponsor” is negative and statistically significant at 1% level in the
models 1, 2 and 5. Controlling for several factors, the baseline model 2 estimates that clinical trials
conducted by firms finish 16 months early than clinical trials conducted by NPO. This result persists
in model 3, as the coefficients of “Firm # of CTs (< 50th perc.)”, “Firm # of CTs (50th to 75th)”,
and “Firm # of CTs (> 75th perc.)” are negative and statistically significant at 1% level. As the three
coefficients have similar magnitude, we infer that previous results were not driven by firm size or
experience in clinical trials. By the other hand, bigger NPOs with more experience (> 75th perc.)
takes additional 5 months to finish a clinical trial in comparison to smaller NPO with less experience
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Table 2.6: OLS Estimation of Duration of Phase II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm Principal Sponsor -16.44∗∗∗ -14.57∗∗∗ -13.85∗∗∗
(0.71) (1.03) (0.83)
Firm Collaborator 1.00 0.93 0.94
(0.80) (0.77) (0.78)
NPO Collaborator 5.35∗∗∗ 5.42∗∗∗ 4.50∗∗∗
(1.00) (0.95) (0.86)
Firm # of CTs (< 50th perc.) -12.85∗∗∗
(0.98)
Firm # of CTs (50th to 75th) -12.20∗∗∗
(1.50)
Firm # of CTs (> 75th perc.) -11.43∗∗∗
(2.09)
NPO # of CTs (50th to 75th) 3.29∗∗∗
(1.13)




PS.Firm with Firm -12.51∗∗∗
(1.61)
PS.Firm with NPO -7.25∗∗∗
(1.86)
PS.Firm with Firm & NPO -14.08∗∗∗
(2.44)
PS.NPO with Firm 1.61
(1.54)
PS.NPO with NPO 5.92∗∗∗
(1.49)
PS.NPO with Firm & NPO 3.38∗
(1.83)
Data Monitoring Committee 3.38∗∗∗
(0.57)
Biological Compound 3.16∗∗∗ 2.92∗∗∗ 3.17∗∗∗ 4.61∗∗∗
(1.05) (1.08) (1.04) (0.96)
# of CTs per Year 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Ln(Enrollment) 1.91∗∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 2.25∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30)
Prob. of Success -0.37 -0.30 -0.35 -0.79∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.30)
Phase I and Phase II 1.88∗∗ 1.76∗∗ 1.82∗∗ 1.91∗∗
(0.82) (0.83) (0.81) (0.87)
Phase II and Phase III 1.79∗ 2.03∗∗ 1.71∗ 2.40∗∗
(0.95) (0.92) (0.95) (1.01)
CT Goals No Yes Yes Yes Yes
CT Design No Yes Yes Yes Yes
CT Endpoint No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Top 20 Countries (# of CTs) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease (30 classes) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Disease (363 subclasses) No No No No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.40
Observations 8933 6137 6137 6137 5236
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered by organizations).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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(< 50th perc.). It looks that bureaucracy related to size affects more the NPOs than firms. Concerned
H2, there is empirical evidence that an external NPO collaboration delays the clinical trials, as
indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient of “NPO Collaborator” at 1% level
in the models 2, 3 and 5. According with baseline model 2, external NPO collaboration delays
the clinical trial in 6 months. However, external firm collaboration has no effect on the duration
of clinical trials as indicated by the non-statistically significant coefficient of “Firm Collaborator”
in the models 2, 3, and 5. Model 4 supports the relative efficiency of external firm collaboration
in comparison to external NPO collaboration. Wald tests indicate that: I) “PS.Firm with Firm”
is statistically different than “PS.Firm with NPO” at 1% level; and II) “PS.NPO with Firm” is
statistically different than “PS.NPO with NPO” at 5% level. Furthermore, combined cooperation
(firm and NPO) delays the clinical trials in comparison to single development by firm or NPO.
For robustness checks, model 5 confirms the results of previous model, but with slightly lower
magnitude of the coefficients due to additional control variables (“Data Monitoring Committee”
and “363 diseases subclasses”) that remove part of variation.
Table 2.8 presents the OLS estimation of duration of phase IV. Overall, the results support
H1, as the coefficient of “Firm Principal Sponsor” is negative and statistically significant at 1%
level in the models 1, 2 and 5. Controlling for several factors, the baseline model 2 estimates that
clinical trials conducted by firms finish 11 months early than clinical trials conducted by NPO.
This result persists in model 3, as the coefficients of “Firm # of CTs (< 50th perc.)”, “Firm # of
CTs (50th to 75th)”, and “Firm # of CTs (> 75th perc.)” are negative and statistically significant
at 1% level. However, bigger firms and NPOs with more experience (> 75th perc.) take longer
to finish clinical trials in comparison to smaller (< 50th perc.) and medium (50th to 75th) size
firms and NPO with less experience. Concerned H2, there is empirical evidence that an external
NPO collaboration delays the clinical trials, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant
coefficient of “NPO Collaborator” at 1% level in the models 2, 3 and 5. According with baseline
model 2, external NPO collaboration delays the clinical trial in 4 months. However, external firm
collaboration has no effect on the duration of clinical trials as indicated by the non-statistically
significant coefficient of “Firm Collaborator” in the models 2, 3, and 5. Model 4 supports the
relative efficiency of external firm collaboration in comparison to external NPO collaboration. Wald
tests indicate that: I) “PS.Firm with Firm” is statistically different than “PS.Firm with NPO” at 5%
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Table 2.7: OLS Estimation of Duration of Phase III
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm Principal Sponsor -16.86∗∗∗ -16.43∗∗∗ -14.23∗∗∗
(1.00) (1.14) (1.09)
Firm Collaborator 0.00 -0.09 0.75
(0.90) (0.89) (0.86)
NPO Collaborator 6.05∗∗∗ 6.03∗∗∗ 5.16∗∗∗
(1.10) (1.08) (1.16)
Firm # of CTs (< 50th perc.) -15.80∗∗∗
(1.19)
Firm # of CTs (50th to 75th) -15.93∗∗∗
(2.24)
Firm # of CTs (> 75th perc.) -16.01∗∗∗
(3.32)
NPO # of CTs (50th to 75th) -1.17
(1.35)




PS.Firm with Firm -17.12∗∗∗
(1.47)
PS.Firm with NPO -8.44∗∗∗
(2.65)
PS.Firm with Firm & NPO -10.10∗∗
(4.63)
PS.NPO with Firm 1.48
(1.85)
PS.NPO with NPO 5.79∗∗∗
(1.42)
PS.NPO with Firm & NPO 7.80∗∗∗
(2.82)
Data Monitoring Committee 4.88∗∗∗
(0.75)
Biological Compound 3.76∗∗∗ 3.76∗∗∗ 3.75∗∗∗ 4.20∗∗∗
(1.31) (1.26) (1.31) (1.32)
# of CTs per Year -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(Enrollment) 1.74∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.29) (0.30) (0.31)
Prob. of Success 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.47
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.37)
Phase II and Phase III 0.50 0.49 0.55 0.36
(1.01) (0.99) (1.01) (1.10)
CT Goals No Yes Yes Yes Yes
CT Design No Yes Yes Yes Yes
CT Endpoint No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Top 20 Countries (# of CTs) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease (30 classes) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Disease (363 subclasses) No No No No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.27 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.39
Observations 5343 4570 4570 4570 3712
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered by organizations).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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level; and II) “PS.NPO with Firm” is statistically different than “PS.NPO with NPO” at 1% level.
Furthermore, combined cooperation (firm and NPO) delays the clinical trials in comparison to single
development by firm or NPO. For robustness checks, model 5 confirms the results of previous
model, but with slightly lower magnitude of the coefficients due to additional control variables
(“Data Monitoring Committee” and “363 diseases subclasses”) that remove part of variation.
Table 2.9 presents the firm principal sponsor impact on the duration of clinical trial for each
phase from I to IV based on nearest-neighbor matching estimator. All estimations have the same
specification of model 2 (Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8). Robust standard errors were calculated based on
Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2012). We also corrected for large-sample bias according with Abadie
and Imbens (2006, 2012), using the variables: “Ln(Enrollment)”, “Minimum Age”, “Maximum
Age”, and “Prob. of Success”. Overall the results of matching estimator are similar to the results of
OLS estimator of Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8. All ATET (Mahalanobis Metric) are statistically significant at
1% level. The matching estimator predicts respectively for phases I, II, III, and IV, that firms finish
clinical trial about 18.8, 16.3, 14.3, and 10.6 months early than NPO. In comparison to the OLS
baseline model 2 of Tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 (respectively 13.2, 14.5, 16.4, and 11.4 months),
the matching estimator estimates a higher impact of “Firm Principal Sponsor” for phase I and II, but
lower impact for phase III and IV. The higher discrepancy between both estimators occurs in phase
I, in which is more likely to suffer of sample bias as described in previous section.
Table 2.10 presents the Cox proportional hazard ratios for duration of clinical trials. All esti-
mations have the same specification of model 2 (Tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8). Robust standard
errors were clustered by organizations. The results are qualitatively similar to OLS and matching
estimators. The variable “Firm Principal Sponsor” is statistically significant at 1% level, and asso-
ciated with a more than 100% increase in the hazard rate (completion of clinical trial) for all phases.
In other words, for any point in time, firms are at least twice more likely to finish the clinical tri-
als than NPOs for all phases. The variable “Firm Collaborator” is not statistically significant, but
variable “NPO Collaborator” is statistically significant at 5% for phase I, and 1% for phases II, III,
and IV. The variable “NPO Collaborator” is associated with about 20% decrease in the hazard rate,
supporting the H2 that external support of NPO delays the completion of the clinical trials.
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Table 2.8: OLS Estimation of Duration of Phase IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm Principal Sponsor -10.09∗∗∗ -11.39∗∗∗ -11.20∗∗∗
(0.91) (1.30) (1.26)
Firm Collaborator -0.62 -0.51 -0.65
(0.88) (0.89) (0.92)
NPO Collaborator 4.63∗∗∗ 4.57∗∗∗ 3.48∗∗∗
(1.06) (1.06) (1.11)
Firm # of CTs (< 50th perc.) -10.44∗∗∗
(1.31)
Firm # of CTs (50th to 75th) -9.48∗∗∗
(3.47)
Firm # of CTs (> 75th perc.) -6.55∗∗
(3.00)
NPO # of CTs (50th to 75th) 1.24
(1.22)




PS.Firm with Firm -12.59∗∗∗
(1.71)
PS.Firm with NPO -4.16
(4.13)
PS.Firm with Firm & NPO -3.90
(3.91)
PS.NPO with Firm -0.58
(1.18)
PS.NPO with NPO 4.40∗∗∗
(1.24)
PS.NPO with Firm & NPO 3.38∗
(1.98)
Data Monitoring Committee 2.40∗∗
(0.94)
Biological Compound -1.84 -1.77 -1.81 1.28
(1.65) (1.67) (1.66) (1.87)
# of CTs per Year -0.02∗ -0.04∗ -0.02∗ -0.03∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Ln(Enrollment) 2.23∗∗∗ 2.25∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
Prob. of Success -0.33 -0.35 -0.35 -0.11
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43)
CT Goals No Yes Yes Yes Yes
CT Design No Yes Yes Yes Yes
CT Endpoint No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Top 20 Countries (# of CTs) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease (30 classes) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Disease (363 subclasses) No No No No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.30
Observations 3525 2669 2669 2669 2288
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered by organizations).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.9: Firm Principal Sponsor Impact (Nearest-Neighbor Matching Estimates of ATET)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV
ATET (Mahalanobis Metric) -18.79∗∗∗ -16.32∗∗∗ -14.31∗∗∗ -10.66∗∗∗
(1.15) (0.93) (1.41) (0.99)
Observations 3031 6137 4570 3411
Note 1: Robust standard errors derived by Abadie and Imbens (2006 and 2012) are in parentheses.
Note 2: Each phase has the same covariates of model 2 (Tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8).
Note 3: All estimations were corrected for large-sample bias according with Abadie and Imbens (2006,
2012), using the variables: Ln(Enrollment), Minimum Age, Maximum Age, and Prob. of Success.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.10: Cox Proportional Hazard Ratios for Duration of Clinical Trials
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV
Firm Principal Sponsor 2.44∗∗∗ 2.30∗∗∗ 2.53∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.13) (0.16) (0.17)
Firm Collaborator 1.02 0.96 1.01 1.08
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
NPO Collaborator 0.87∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Biological Compound 0.77∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗ 0.99
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
# of CTs per Year 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln(Enrollment) 0.78∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Prob. of Success 1.03 1.03∗ 0.98 1.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Phase I and Phase II 0.83∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Phase II and Phase III 0.86∗∗∗ 0.91
(0.05) (0.05)
CT Goals Yes Yes Yes Yes
CT Design Yes Yes Yes Yes
CT Endpoint Yes Yes Yes Yes
Top 20 Countries (# of CTs) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease (30 classes) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Likelihood -20264.84 -46421.46 -33267.29 -18111.08
Observations 3017 6132 4563 2662
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered by organizations).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.7 Conclusion
This study provided empirical evidence that firms are more efficient in conducting clinical trials than
NPOs. Specifically, based on our OLS baseline model, we estimated that firms finish clinical trials
13, 14, 16, and 11 months earlier than NPOs respectively for phases I, II, III, and IV. Other evidence
that firms manage more efficiently clinical trials is that NPOs external support delays clinical trials
in 2, 5, 6, and 4 months respectively for phases I, II, III, and IV, but firm external support doesn’t
appear to affect the duration of clinical trials for any phase. Therefore, we provide empirical support
to Aghion et al. (2008) theoretical prediction that firms have comparative advantage in the late-stage
research; whereas NPOs have comparative advantage in the early-stage research.
Although we run several specifications, control for several factors, and check our results with
matching estimators, our study has some limitations that can be addressed in future research. First,
this study represents a static picture of relative efficiency as the sample is restricted to the clini-
cal trials with starting year from 2006 to 2011. It would be interesting to study the dynamics of
efficiency over long time horizon. If our main hypothesis is right, the proportion of clinical trials
conducted by firms suppose to increase over time in the absence of external factors (ex: tax credit,
or NIH funding of NPOs), or an isomorphism process between firms and NPOs might occur over
time [Dimaggio and Powell (1983)]. Second, this study focus on duration of clinical trials, but
other dimensions like cost and expected revenue could be integrated to our analysis if private data
becomes publicly available. Third, this study didn’t model or collect data about specific routines,
practices, and procedures that confer competitive advantage to the firms in managing clinical trials.
Neither, we show empirically the comparative advantage of NPOs in the early-stage research, what
represents a big gap in the literature.
The policy implication of this study is why not publicly fund or provide tax incentives to firms
to conduct clinical trials instead of NPOs? Our secondary results indicate that there is no difference
in efficiency among firms in terms of scale and experience. Therefore, why doesn’t federal agency
fund small biotechs to run clinical trials instead of NPOs? Instead of funding clinical trials of NPOs,
why not reallocate the funding to early-stage research such as basic science and research tools?
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
SPECIALIZATION ON THE TIMING OF TECHNOLOGICAL
COLLABORATION IN THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
3.1 Introduction
The diffusion of biopharmaceutical innovations is an important driver of increasing life span and
social welfare seen since the Industrial Revolution [Reinganum (1989), Hoppe (2002), Lichtenberg
(2005), Stoneman and Battisti (2010)]. QuintilesIMS (2016) predicts that the worldwide spending
on drugs will increase from $1 trillion in 2014 to $1.5 trillion in 2021. Although the diffusion of
innovation understood as technology embodied in the final product ready for commercialization is
a classical topic studied in Economics [Griliches (1957), Berndt et al. (2003)], little is known about
the diffusion of inventions or the timing of technological collaboration, a step that precedes the in-
novation. The exception are the studies of Katila and Mang (2003), Gans et al. (2008), Allain et al.
(2009) that point out respectively how prior R&D collaboration experience, intellectual property
rights protection, and competition in the final product speed up or delay the technological collab-
oration. Surprisingly, no empirical study investigated specifically how scientific and technological
specialization would affect the timing of technological collaboration or research alliance.
An example of diffusion of invention is the messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) technology de-
veloped by Moderna Therapeutics. The mRNA technology consists in instructing the human cells
to produce specific proteins against a disease. Moderna Therapeutics was founded in 2011. In 2012,
this biotech firm already had important patents related to mRNA technology and scientific publica-
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tions in journals like RNA and Nature Immunology. In 2013, AstraZeneca payed $240 million to
Moderna Therapeutics for five years of collaboration in discovering and developing mRNA drugs
against cancer and cardiometabolic diseases. From 2015 to 2016, Merck & Co. entered in multiple
alliances with Moderna Therapeutics to acquire expertise in mRNA technology for cancer vaccine
and infectious diseases.
From theoretical point of view, several models [Aghion and Tirole (1994), Aghion et al. (2008)]
assume that technological specialization increases the innovation performance. However, there is
no consensus on how scientific specialization affects the innovation performance. For some authors
[Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Cockburn and Henderson (1998), Arora and Gambardella (1994)],
scientific capabilities increase innovation performance via absorptive capacity, the ability to assimi-
late external knowledge and technology. For others [Nelson (1959), Arrow (1962), Partha and David
(1994)], scientific knowledge is a public good and should be produced by non-profit organizations
given the appropriation and underprovision problems. Aghion et al. (2008) defend that academic
institutions have comparative advantage in the early stages of research (scientific domain); whereas
firms have comparative advantage in the late stages of research (technological domain).
To test how scientific and technological specialization affect the timing of technological col-
laboration, we propose a new measure of specialization and timing of technological collaboration.
As each alliance targets a specific technology (ex: monoclonal antibodies, recombinant DNA, stem
cells, and etc) or disease (leukemia, diabetes, Parkinson’s disease, and etc), we can count the sci-
entific publications and patents that have these keywords in the title or abstract. Therefore, we
measure how a firm is specialized in a specific technology or disease, and not in general categories
such as anatomical therapeutic classes, scientific disciplines, or patent classes. Related to the timing
of technological collaboration, we measure the timing between the licensor’s first scientific publi-
cation (that cites a specific technology or diseases) and the starting date of alliance. We assume that
the first scientific publication represents the “birth” of know-how or invention in a most elementary
form. The drawback of this measure is that some firms engage in alliances, but they don’t publish
or might not have a publication that cites a specific technology or diseases. In this case, the timing
of collaboration cannot be observed, but we correct for this selection problem, using the Heckman
selection model.
After controlling for the factors described in the literature [Katila and Mang (2003), Gans et al.
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(2008), Allain et al. (2009)] and other factors at alliance and firm level, we found that licensor
specialization is the main factor to speed up the technological collaboration in the biopharmaceutical
industry. We interpret this result as evidence that the licensor has a more critical role than the
licensee in decreasing the uncertainty and asymmetric information problems around the market
for technology. Only after the licensor signaling the existence of the technology and potential
application without allowing others to invent around or reverse engineering, the licensee can decide
to participate or not in the partnership.
Our result is important because the empirical literature of market for technology [Cassiman and
Veugelers (2006), Higgins and Rodriguez (2006), Arora and Gambardella (2010), Ceccagnoli et al.
(2014)] has focused on the determinants of demand side given the availability of data about the li-
censee (usually big firms), and we show evidence that supply side (usually small specialized firms)
matters more. Based on our benchmark specification of the Heckman selection model, we estimated
that an increase of 10% in the licensor scientific specialization speeds up the technological collab-
oration in about 4 months; whereas an increase of 10% in the licensor technological specialization
speeds up the technological collaboration in about 5 months. Furthermore, our results suggest that
licensee scientific and technological specialization in the same technology or disease of the licensor
don’t look to affect the timing of technological collaboration. A finding that is aligned with the
theory of comparative advantage, as specialization must be in different tasks or stages, in order to
explore the differences in opportunity cost and potential complementarities between activities.
3.2 Literature Review
Our research question is mainly related to two broad literature streams: 1) the diffusion of innova-
tion; and 2) the innovation performance. In the first stream, we focus on the timing of technological
collaboration, a topic not much explored. In the second stream, we cover specifically how scientific
and technological specialization affects the innovation performance.
3.2.1 The Timing of Technological Collaboration
The landmark study concerned the diffusion of innovation is the paper of Griliches (1957), who
analyzed how profitability affected the adoption of hybrid corn in United States from 1932 to 1956.
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Since then, a vast theoretical and empirical literature emerged [Reinganum (1989), Hoppe (2002),
Stoneman and Battisti (2010)], covering mainly how uncertainty, market structure, and strategic in-
teraction affect the adoption of innovation. For example, Berndt et al. (2003) showed how the price,
quality, entry timing, and consumption externality affect the diffusion rate of antiulcer drugs. Over-
all, this stream of literature focuses on innovation as a final product ready for commercialization, or
an intermediate input or process ready to be employed. Little attention was given for the timing of
technological collaboration, a step that precedes the innovation. The exception is Katila and Mang
(2003), Gans et al. (2008), Allain et al. (2009) that analyzed how different factors might speed up
or delay the technological collaboration.
Katila and Mang (2003) analyzed the history of 86 biopharmaceutical product-development
projects from 1976 to1992 and found that R&D-intensive biotechnology firms that have prior R&D
collaboration experience are faster in exploiting technological opportunities. They also found that
the establishment of state biotechnology centers and an increasing of intellectual property protec-
tion speed up the technological collaboration. It is worth mentioning that Katila and Mang (2003)
focus on exploitation and not on exploration of technological opportunities in the discovery phase.
Neither they include different legal arrangements such as joint ventures, licensing, and co-licensing
agreements in the sample.
Gans et al. (2008) investigated the impact of intellectual property system on the timing of licens-
ing between start-up entrepreneurs and established firms across four industry sectors (biotechnol-
ogy, electronics, software, and scientific instruments). In a sample of 198 technology licensing deals
between 1990 and 1999, Gans et al. (2008) found that patent allowance (the administrative event
when patent rights are clarified) is associated with a 70% increase in the hazard rate of achieving a
licensing agreement. This finding suggests that uncertainty about intellectual property rights delays
technological cooperation. However, other frictions in the market of technology due to asymmet-
ric information, appropriability hazards, transaction costs might also play an important role on the
timing of cooperation.
Allain et al. (2009) developed a model that predicts an inverted U-shaped relationship between
competition and licensing delays in the case of asymmetric information about the value of technol-
ogy. In a sample of 2212 licensing deals started since 1973 in the pharmaceutical industry, Allain
et al. (2009) found empirical support that in concentrated markets, an increase in the number of
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potential licensees delays licensing; whereas in competitive markets, an increase in the number of
potential licensees speed up licensing. Although Allain et al. (2009) assume that the licensor is
a perfect monopolist, there is also certain degree of competition in the supply side. In fact, the
biopharmaceutical sector is characterized by far more small biotechnologies firms specialized in re-
search than big consolidated pharmaceutical firms with comparative advantage in development and
marketing of drugs.
3.2.2 Scientific and Technological Specialization
According with Arora and Gambardella (1994), scientific capability is the ability to evaluate in-
formation based on general and abstract principles; whereas technological capability is the ability
to use or apply information. This distinction is relevant for the biopharmaceutical sector, as there
is a labor division among academic institutions, small specialized firms, and big pharmaceutical
firms. Stuart et al. (2007) argue that biotech firms evaluate and select scientific discoveries from
universities, and pass it to big pharmaceutical firms.
Several studies [Henderson and Cockburn (1996), Cockburn and Henderson (1998), Nesta and
Saviotti (2005), Garcia-Vega (2006), Miller (2006), Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco (2008),
Toh and Kim (2013)] investigate how technological specialization or diversification affects the inno-
vation or firm performance. However, to the best of our knowledge no study investigates specifically
how scientific specialization together with technological specialization affect the timing of techno-
logical collaboration.
From theoretical point of view, Aghion and Tirole (1994) point out that the innovation perfor-
mance of an independent research unit (licensor) would be higher than a dependent research unit of
the licensee. In the same line, based on the tradeoff between creative freedom vs pecuniary focus,
Aghion et al. (2008) argue that the academic sector would have comparative advantage in the early
stage of research (scientific domain); whereas the private sector would have comparative advantage
in the late stages of research (technological domain).
Overall, the empirical literature found that technological diversification fosters the innovation
and firm performance. The common theoretical justification is that economies of scope is more
important than economies of scale at research level. The argument is that cross-fertilization among
different technologies and the risk mitigation of pursuing parallel technological paths more than
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compensate the cost of technological diversification. In the US. pharmaceutical sector from 1989
to 1997, Nesta and Saviotti (2005) found that a coherent technological diversification measured by
patent classes enhances the firm’s innovative performance measured by number of citation-weighted
patents. In a set of European firms distributed in 15 different sectors from 1995 to 2000, Garcia-
Vega (2006) also found that technological diversification enhances the firm’s innovative perfor-
mance measured by number of patents and R&D intensity. In a sample of U.S. biotechnology firms
from 1976 to 2001, Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco (2008) found that technological di-
versification has a stronger effect on radical innovation than incremental innovation. In a sample
of U.S. firms from different industrial sectors from 1990, Miller (2006) found that technological
diversification increases the market value of the firms.
However, contrary to the conventional wisdom that firms should hold real options across dif-
ferent technologies in face of uncertainty, Toh and Kim (2013) found that greater technological
uncertainty increases the firm’s technological specialization in the U.S. communications equipment
industry. According to the Toh and Kim (2013), there is competition among technologies, and
specialization fosters the probability of the firm’s technology wins the competition.
3.3 Hypothesis
For the classical economists, the source of value creation is the division of labor. Under specific
assumptions such as perfect information, zero transaction cost, and etc, if each part specializes
in the task, in which he/she has comparative advantage, the total production of the goods will be
maximized. Then, the parties can exchange the goods and realize the gains of specialization. The
same logic applies to the strategic alliances. The idea behind of the existence of technological
collaboration is that the parties can combine different capabilities and resources, in order to create
value.
Besides value creation, licensor specialization in certain technology or disease also sends a
stronger signal that can mitigate the market failure problems: I) information asymmetry [Akerlof
(1970)], II) disclosure dilemma [Anton and Yao (1994, 2002)], and III) valuation difficulty [Con-
tractor and Ra (2002)].
Usually the licensor has superior information about the technology. Specially when the tech-
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nology has tacit elements embedded in the routines and employees of the firms [Nelson and Winter
(1982)], the asymmetry tends to be high. Pisano (1997) argues that biotechs take advantage of
asymmetric information and license-out the “lemons” compounds to pharmaceutical firms. How-
ever, Arora et al. (2009), Arora and Gambardella (2010) minimizes the importance of information
asymmetric problems in the biopharmaceutical industry, alleging that: 1) both parties usually op-
erate in the same industry or market; 2) the licensee is usually a sophisticated buyer with technical
expertise similar to the licensor; and 3) regulatory authority imposes information disclosure in the
clinical trials.
Related to the disclosure dilemma, the potential licensees want to learn more about how the
technology can be integrated with their internal resources and capabilities, in order to create value.
However, in the negotiation phase, the licensor might be reticent to disclosure information and
reveal too much at the point that the potential licensees can proceed by their own, invent around,
reverse-engineer, or simply misappropriate the technology. Arrow (1962) was the first to articulate
the problem that the licensee has no incentive to pay the licensor after the information about the
invention is disclosed.
Anton and Yao (1994, 2002) argue that this problem can be mitigated if there is competition
among licensees or the invention can be partially disclosed. In the first case, the licensor can treat
to destroy the rent of the first licensee, selling the invention to other potential licensees. In the
second case, the licensor can partially signal the invention and receives the payment equivalent of
the remaining undisclosed know-how. Overall, the market failure literature overlooks the learning
aspect of strategic alliances and magnifies the problems of opportunistic behavior. The license
agreement is designed to protect the proprietary know-how of both parties [Kale et al. (2000)].
For example, royalty clause, milestone payments, and equity purchase minimize the problem of
misappropriation of intellectual property rights. Reputation and repetitive cooperation also inhibit
opportunistic behavior.
Furthermore, the evaluation of the technology is not only difficulty because of the asymmet-
ric information and disclosure dilemma. The technology per se might involve a high degree of
complexity and uncertainty, making the monetary valuation a very complicate task. Even if the
licensor wants to disclose all information available about the technology and tries to codify the tacit
knowledge, the technology valuation is just a gross estimation with high variance given market and
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commercial uncertainties. Therefore, the licensee willingness to pay is likely to be different than
the reservation price of the licensor.
Considering that specialization creates value and sends a stronger signal about the scientific and
technological capabilities of the licensor that mitigates some market failure problems, we hypothe-
size that:
Hypothesis 1a: Higher the scientific specialization of the licensor, faster is the technological col-
laboration.
Hypothesis 1b: Higher the technological specialization of the licensor, faster is the technological
collaboration.
The logic of division of labor is that each part specializes in different tasks or stages given the differ-
ences in opportunity cost. If the licensor and licensee specialize in the same technology and disease,
the probability of exploring complementarities between resources and capabilities decreases given
the redundancy. Higher value surplus is created, when the licensee can access externally the tech-
nology that is unfeasible or expensive to develop internally. Therefore, if the licensee is an expert in
the technology and disease domain of the licensor, the licensee has incentives to delay or even not
starting the technology collaboration.
By the other hand, someone might argue that licensee specialization speeds up the technological
collaboration based on the mitigation of the market failure problems described previously. Although
the licensee specialization decreases the asymmetric information and uncertainty about the expected
value of the technology, this impact is less critical if compared to the role of the licensor in reveal-
ing information and emitting the appropriate signal. Furthermore, to take advantage of external
technology, the licensee might need absorptive capacity in different fields and not necessary be a
specialist.
Therefore, as the licensee specialization is subject to two opposite effects described above, we
hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2a: The scientific specialization of the licensee in the same technology or disease of
the licensor doesn’t affect the timing of the technological collaboration.
Hypothesis 2b: The technological specialization of the licensee in the same technology or disease
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of the licensor doesn’t affect the timing of the technological collaboration.
3.4 Data
The main database is BiosciDB, a comprehensive peer-reviewed reference database on biopharma
alliances updated by press releases, SEC filed contracts, and more than 5,000 unredacted contracts
obtained through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) disclosures. BiosciDB is a relatively new
dataset and little explored if compared to other alliance datasets such as: Securities Data Com-
pany (SDC) and Recombinant Capital (RECAP) both from Thomson Reuters. SDC is the most
famous and used dataset for empirical studies in alliances, but it doesn’t have the same level of
details of RECAP and BiosciDB related to biopharma alliances. The original creators of RECAP
are the same creators of BiosciDB. Both databases follow the same structure with similar informa-
tion. However, the creators of BiosciDB claimed to have substantially more unredacted contracts
than RECAP. BiosciDB contains information about deal types, contract summary, parties (includ-
ing tracking M&A), type of technology, target diseases, monetary compensation (size of the deal,
royalties and equity), stage and date in which the contract was signed, and etc. One important func-
tionality of BiosciDB website is that for almost all alliances, it is possible to download the original
contract, a service not always offered by other alliance databases.
The patent dataset was extracted from Derwent Innovations Index in the Web of Science plat-
form, a product of Thomson Reuters. Derwent Innovations Index covers over 14.3 million patents
across 40 countries. Each patent record is corrected, analyzed, abstracted and manually indexed by
subject experts from Thomson Reuters.
The scientific publication dataset was extracted from Scopus, a bibliographic database owned by
Elsevier. Scopus covers over 21,500 academic journals and contains more than 60 million records.
Each record contains detailed information about the scientific publication such as title, authors,
address affiliation, keywords, abstract, citations, and etc.
The competition variable and ATC1 concordance (Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classifica-
tion System) are from Pharmaprojects database, a product of Citeline. Pharmaprojects tracks drugs
pipeline since 1980, covering all stages of drug development from discovery through clinical trials
to drug approval and commercialization. Besides providing a detailed development history timeline
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of over 60,000 drug profiles, Pharmaprojects includes licensing and sponsoring organization details
together with a description of the disease, therapy, mechanism, delivery routes, chemical data and
molecular structure.
Firm level accounting data (R&D expenditure, employment, assets, cash, etc.) was extracted
from U.S. Compustat 1993–2013. About 17% of values were missing. We replaced these missing
values using the Stata command “ipolate” (a linear interpolation method). As these variables change
linearly over time and we observe the values for adjacent years by firm, we use years as predictor
variable for the linear interpolation. All monetary variables were adjusted by inflation (base year
2013), using the Consumer Price Index from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
We started with 4384 alliances from BiosciDB. We removed alliances related to natural products
or with missing values in the key variables such as technology and disease field. As the geographical
focus of BiosciDB is United States, we also restricted the sample to publicly traded companies
present in the U.S. Compustat, that is, nonprofit organizations as universities were removed from
the sample. One limitation of dataset is that all information is limited to the alliance formation, that
is, we don’t observe the progression of alliance like success and failure rate.
Our final sample was composed by 845 alliances started from 1994 to 2014, and distributed
among 357 licensors and 220 licensees.
3.4.1 Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of the dependent, independent, and control variables de-
scribed below. Table 3.2 presents the correlation matrix of these variables.
3.4.1.1 Dependent Variable
“Alliance Lag” is the main dependent variable; whereas “Pub.Likelihood” is the dependent variable
of the selection model.
We defined the dependent variable “Alliance Lag” measured in years to be equal to the “Alliance
Date” minus the “First Publication Date”. The “Alliance Date” is the starting date of the alliance a.
The “First Publication Date” is the date of the oldest publication of the licensor s that cites a specific
technology t or a targeted diseases d. We restricted our search for scientific publications to 25 years
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Alliance Lag 679 9.57 7.94 0 25
Pub.Likelihood 845 0.80 0.40 0 1
Licensor Sci. Spec. 845 0.25 0.29 0 1
Licensor Tech. Spec. 845 0.30 0.29 0 1
Licensee Sci. Spec. 845 0.15 0.21 0 1
Licensee Tech. Spec. 845 0.17 0.21 0 1
Licensor Patent Classes 845 9.20 10.4 0 98
Licensee Patent Classes 845 13.9 18.7 0 249
Licensor Experience 845 4.35 5.21 0 29
Licensee Experience 845 17.1 21.3 0 101
Prior Collaboration 845 0.18 0.51 0 5
Technology Complexity 845 1.25 0.68 0 2
Competition 845 0.77 0.67 0 1.62
Equity Alliance 845 0.31 0.46 0 1
Licensor Cash ($Billion) 845 0.83 2.29 -1.26 15.6
Licensee Cash ($Billion) 845 2.25 3.43 -1.38 21.1
Licensor R&D Intensity 845 0.59 1.20 0 5.84
Licensee R&D Intensity 845 0.27 0.57 0 3.44
Licensor Size 845 11.5 27.5 0.0010 138
Licensee Size 845 34.5 40.4 0.0010 333
before the “Alliance Date”. The results of Table 3.3 and 3.4 remain the same if we restrict the
search for publications to 20 or 30 years before the “Alliance Date”. The “First Publication Date”
is a proxy for the “birth” of know-how or technology in a most elementary form. We don’t use
the “First Patent Date”, because patent represents a consolidated technology, and several alliances
precede the patent application or grant [Gans et al. (2008)]. It takes on average 10 years from the
“birth” of know-how or technology until the technological cooperation.
The other dependent variable “Pub.Likelihood” is coded as 1 if the licensor s published any
academic article 25 years before the “Alliance Date” that cites a specific technology t or a tar-
geted diseases d, and 0 otherwise. For 80% of alliances, the licensor published at least one aca-
demic paper related to technology t or a targeted diseases d. By definition “Alliance Lag” only
can be observed if “Pub. Likelihood” is equal to 1. Among 845 alliances, we observe 679 al-
liance lags. In order to deal with this 166 missing values for “Alliance Lag”, we use the variable
“Pub.Likelihood” as dependent variable in the selection model described in the next section. As the

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































created the variable “# Pub.Citation” used as dependent variable of the negative binomial model
of Table 3.3. “# Pub.Citation” is the number of scientific publications of the licensor s that cites
a specific technology t or a targeted diseases d. Each publication was weighted by the number of
citations received until August 2016.
3.4.1.2 Independent Variables
“Licensor Sci. Spec.”. Licensor scientific specialization is the proportion of the scientific publi-
cation of the licensor s that cites a specific technology t or a targeted diseases d during 25 years
before the “Alliance Date”. Each publication was weighed by citations received until August 2016,
in order to control for the impact and quality of the signal emitted by the licensor s. We don’t use
the raw number of publications that cites a specific technology t or a targeted diseases d, because
this measure would capture size effect or overall scientific capability instead of specialization. For
example, normalized measure of innovation like scientific publications and patents divided by R&D
expenditure indicate that biotech firms are more innovative than big pharmaceutical firms [Arora
et al. (2014)].
“Licensor Tech. Spec.”. Licensor technological specialization is the proportion of patents of
the licensor s that cites a specific technology t or a targeted diseases d during 25 years before the
“Alliance Date”. Our measure of technological specialization is more specific than employed in the
literature. For example, as a proxy for technological specialization, Toh and Kim (2013) use the
Herfindahl index (a measure of concentration) calculated based on patent classes.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to import from Derwent Innovations Index the number of cita-
tions that a patent received. Thomson Reuters might add this functionality in the future. However,
we weighted each patent in the following way: a triadic patent filled at the European Patent Office
(EPO), the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the Japan Patent Office (JPO)
receives value 3; whereas a non-triadic patent receives value 1.
“Licensee Sci. Spec.”. Licensee scientific specialization is the proportion of the scientific pub-
lication of the licensee b that cites a specific technology t or a targeted diseases d during 25 years
before the “Alliance Date”. Each publication was weighed by citations received until August 2016,
in order to control for the strength of scientific capability of the licensee b.
“Licensee Tech. Spec.”. Licensee technological specialization is the proportion of patents of
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the licensee b that cites a specific technology t or a targeted diseases d during 25 years before the
“Alliance Date”. We also weighted each patent using the triadic patent method.
It is worth mentioning that the weight methods used for the construction of the independent
variables above are common employed in the literature, in order to deal with noise and uncertainty
about the value of each publication and patent. However, in this paper the use or not use of these
weight methods doesn’t affect the results of Table 3.3 and 3.4, what makes sense considering that
we already restricted the publications and patents to specific technology t or a targeted diseases d.
“Licensor Patent Classes”. Given the patents of licensor s that cite a specific technology t or
a targeted diseases d during the 25 years before the “Alliance Date”, we sum up the total number
of 3-digit patent classes. Derwent Innovations Index divides the patents in three groups: chemical,
engineering, and electrical. One division of chemical is “B - Pharmaceuticals”, in which is com-
posed by 3-digit classes, such as: B01 - Steroids; B02 - Fused ring heterocyclics; and etc. The total
numbers of 3-digit patent classes is 291 and the classes are not mutually exclusive.
“Licensee Patent Classes”. Given the patents of licensee b that cite a specific technology t or a
targeted diseases d during the 25 years before the “Alliance Date”, we sum up the total number of
3-digit patent classes.
The “Licensor Patent Classes” measures the technological diversification given a specific tech-
nology t or a targeted diseases d; whereas the variable “Licensor Tech. Spec.” measures the licensor
technological specialization in relation to his whole portfolio of patents. Furthermore, except the
“Licensor Sci. Spec.” and “Licensor Sci. Spec.” that is moderate correlated (0.44), all indepen-
dent variables are weakly pairwise correlated according with Table 3.2. The results remain the
same in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, if we drop the variables “Licensor Patent Classes” and “Licensee Patent
Classes”.
3.4.1.3 Control Variables
“Licensor Experience”. It is the cumulative number of alliances engaged by the licensor s until the
starting date of the alliance a in the BioSciDB since 1980.
“Licensee Experience”. It is the cumulative number of alliances engaged by the licensee b until
the starting date of the alliance a in the BioSciDB since 1980. The average number of previous
alliance is about 4 for the licensor and 17 for the licensee.
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“Prior Collaboration”. It is the cumulative number of alliances in the BioSciDB since 1980,
in which the licensor s and the licensee b cooperate before the starting date of the alliance a. The
mean for “Prior Collaboration” is 0.18. This lower value indicates that few firms engage in alliances
with the same partner. One explanation is that many licensors are acquired by the licensee after the
technological collaboration [Higgins and Rodriguez (2006)]. Katila and Mang (2003) found that
previous R&D collaboration with the same partner accelerates the actual technological collabora-
tion.
“Technology Complexity”. We classify each technology t of alliance a, in three groups. Less
complex technologies related to drug delivery and diagnostics were assigned value 0. Moderate
complex technologies (ex: screening and chemical synthesis) related to chemical compounds were
assigned value 1. More sophisticated technologies related to biologic compounds (ex: monoclonal
antibodies, recombinant DNA, and stem cells) were assigned value 2. Each category represents
respectively 12.2%, 49.2%, and 38.6% of the sample.
“Competition”. It is the cumulative number of drug approval for a targeted diseases d by regula-
tory authorities around the world since 1977 until the starting date of the alliance a. We divided this
variable by 100. The mean of this variable is 0.77. This number is relatively big because several al-
liances target many diseases or a set of connected diseases. In the chemical industry, Fosfuri (2006)
found that the number of technology licensing follows an inverted U-shaped relationship with the
number of potential licensors.
“Equity Alliance”. This variable was coded as 1, if the licensor s cedes any degree of control or
ownership to the licensee b, and 0 otherwise. The literature of governance structure [Pisano (1989),
Oxley (1997), Das and Teng (2000), Santoro and McGill (2005)] points out that equity alliances are
more likely to involve a “learning process” than mere transfer or access of technology.
“Licensor Cash”. It is the amount of any immediately negotiable medium of exchange of the
licensor s in the year before the starting date of the alliance a. This variable was measured in
billions of US dollars. The idea is to control for firm liquidity as in Katila and Mang (2003), Toh
and Kim (2013). Under financial constraint the licensor might try to speed up any technological
collaboration.
“Licensee Cash”. It is the amount of any immediately negotiable medium of exchange of the
licensee b in the year before the starting date of the alliance a. This variable was measured in billions
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of US dollars. If the licensee has abundance of cash given higher drug sales or business divestiture,
the licensee might be interested to speed up the technological collaboration. On average, the licensee
(U$ 2.25 billion) has about 3 times more cash than the licensor (U$ 830 million).
“Licensor R&D Intensity”. It is ratio between the R&D expenditure and total assets of the licen-
sor s in the year before the starting date of the alliance a. The mean of licensor R&D intensity (0.59)
is about twice higher than the mean of licensee R&D intensity (0.27). As the licensor is the “seller”
of R&D and the licensee is the “buyer” of R&D, this R&D expenditure difference might represent
the optimum level for each side. Concerned the timing of technological collaboration, Katila and
Mang (2003) found that the R&D intensity of the licensor speeds up the alliance formation.
“Licensee R&D Intensity”. It is ratio between the R&D expenditure and total assets of the
licensee b in the year before the starting date of the alliance a. Usually R&D intensity is used as a
proxy for absorptive capacity of the licensee [Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Arora and Gambardella
(1990)]. However, higher R&D intensity is not only related to higher capacity to identify and use
external technology, but also with higher internal capabilities to develop the technology in-house
as well. There is no consensus in the literature if internal R&D and external R&D (alliances)
are substitutes or complements [Colombo and Garrone (1996), Cassiman and Veugelers (2006),
Ceccagnoli et al. (2014)]. Less is known how the licensee R&D intensity affects the timing of
technological collaboration.
“Licensor Size”. Number of employees of licensor s in the year before the starting date of the
alliance a. This variable was divided by 1000.
“Licensee Size”. Number of employees of licensee b in the year before the starting date of the
alliance a. This variable was divided by 1000. On average the licensee is three times bigger than
the licensor. Quite often the licensee, the buyer of technology, is a consolidated big pharmaceutical
firm; whereas the licensor, the seller of technology, is a small biotech.
“ATC1”. They are dummies for 12 ATC level 1 not mutually exclusive classes: ATC_A (Ali-
mentary tract and metabolism), ATC_B (Blood and blood forming organs), ATC_C (Cardiovascular
system), ATC_D (Dermatologicals), ATC_G (Genito-urinary system and sex hormones), ATC_H
(Systemic hormonal preparations), ATC_J (Antiinfectives for systemic use), ATC_L (Antineoplas-
tic and immunomodulating agents), ATC_M (Musculo-skeletal system), ATC_N (Nervous system),
ATC_R (Respiratory system), and ATC_S (Sensory organs). Based on diseases d and Pharmapro-
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jects concordance, each alliance a was classified in one or more ATC1, and there is no alliance
covering the ATC_P (Antiparasitic products) in the final sample.
“Year”. Dummies for alliance starting year from 1994 to 2014.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
Our goal is to estimate how scientific and technological specialization impact the timing of the
technological collaboration. For that purpose, we compiled a unique dataset at alliance level. As we
observe for each alliance the type of technology employed (ex: monoclonal antibodies, recombinant
DNA, stem cells, and etc) and the targeted disease (leukemia, diabetes, Parkinson’s disease, and etc),
we could search the specific patents and publications that cover both technology and disease. This
approach represents a methodological advance, as the literature has been using the absolute number
of patents and publication at firm level, and we were able to delimit the patents and publication at
alliance level. For example, in 2016 the accumulated patent portfolio of Merck was above 10,900
patents, but only 23 patents were related to monoclonal antibodies technology.
The dependent variable “Alliance Lag” that represents the timing of technological collaboration
can be observed only if the licensor s decides to publish. Firms have different propensity to publish
based on strategic reasons. For example, in the case of recombinant DNA technology, Figure 3.1
and 3.2 show the top 10 firms based respectively on publications and patents. Big pharmaceuti-
cal firms like Pfizer and Merck are top 10 in terms of scientific publications but not in terms of
patents in recombinant DNA. Two Japanese firms (Kyowa Kirin and Takeda) are in the second and
third position in terms of patents in recombinant DNA, but they don’t have much scientific publi-
cations compared to American and European firms. For some firms, publishing and patenting are
complements; whereas for others substitutes. Probably, firms that don’t publish are more likely to
rely on patents for signaling purpose. If we run only one separated regression to estimate the “Al-
liance Lag”, the coefficients have to be interpreted as conditioned to firms that decided to publish.
In order to generalize the results to the larger sample, sample selection models [Heckman (1976),
Puhani (2000), Cameron and Trivedi (2005)] can be used such as the limited information maximum



































































Top 10 Firms by Publications in Recombinant DNA





























































Top 10 Firms by Patents in Recombinant DNA
Figure 3.2: Top 10 Firms based on Patents in Recombinant DNA
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The selection models consist of selection equation and outcome equation:
Pr[Pub.Likelihood]1 = x
′
1β1 + u1 (3.1)
Alliance_Lag2 = x
′
2β2 + v2 (3.2)
where Pr[Pub.Likelihood]1 is a dummy variable that captures the probability of the licensor s to





2 are the vectors of explanatory variables used respectively in the selection and outcome
equations, β1 and β2 are the vectors of coefficients to be estimated, and u1 and v2 are the usual error
terms for the correspondent selection and outcome equations.
The Heckman selection method consists first in estimating the selection equation 3.1 using the
Probit regression. Then, the predicted probabilities generated in the first step is used to construct






where φ(·) is the normal probability density function, Φ(·) is the normal cumulative distribution
function, and β̂1 is the vector of coefficients obtained from the first step Probit regression. In the
second step, the outcome equation 3.2 is estimated by OLS, using the λ as a control variable:
Alliance_Lag2 = α2Licensor_Sci.Spec.+ δ2Licensor_Tech.Spec.
+η2Licensee_Sci.Spec.+ θ2Licensee_Tech.Spec.+ x
′
2β2 + σ12λ1 + v2 (3.4)
where Licensor_Sci. Spec., Licensor_Tech.Spec., Licensee_Sci.Spec., and Licensee_Tech
.Spec. are the variables of interest, α2, δ2, η2, and θ2 are the respective coefficients of the variables
of interest, σ12 is the error covariance between the first step equation and second step equation. The
Wald test can be used to test if the errors are uncorrelated (σ12 = 0). If the errors are correlated
(σ12 6= 0), the sample selection correction is necessary. Without the correction, the OLS estimation
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would suffer from the omitted variable bias, leading to inconsistent estimation of α2, δ2, η2, and θ2.
The standard errors are adjusted according with Heckman (1979), considering the first step and the
estimation error of λ.
Instead of using the two steps of Heckman selection method, it is possible to estimate the se-
lection equation 3.1 and outcome equation 3.2 by using the full information maximum likelihood
estimator with robust standard errors clustered by licensee level. Although Monte Carlo studies
[Puhani (2000)] show that FIML estimator are in general more efficient than the Heckman selection
estimator, the FIML estimator demands the stronger assumption that the correlated errors (u1 and
v2) are joint normally distributed and homoskedastic [Cameron and Trivedi (2005)].
Besides adjusting for selection, we added a set of control variables at alliance and firm level
described in the previous section to equation 3.2. The idea is to control for any potential factor
described in the literature that might affect the timing of collaboration, and is correlated with our
independent variable “specialization”, avoiding any omitted variable problem. We also added 12
ATC1 dummies variables to control for opportunity technology or specificities in different anatomi-
cal therapeutic classes. Finally, we added dummy variables for years to control for potential shocks
or trends over the time. Given the relatively small sample size, we didn’t add dummies for the
licensors and licensees. Otherwise, we would have more variables than observations. However, we
tested different specifications with dummies for 10, 25, and 50 big licensors and licensees based
on numbers of alliances, and the results of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 remained the same. We also tested
interaction terms among the dependent variables, but they were not statistically significant.
3.6 Results
Table 3.3 presents the estimation of selection equation. All regressions control for ATC1 (12
anatomical therapeutic classes) and starting year of the alliance. Robust standard errors are clus-
tered at licensor level in the regression 1; whereas for regressions 2 and 3, standard errors were
calculated and adjusted jointly with Alliance Lag equations of Table 3.4 . In the regression 1, a
Negative Binomial estimation of the number of publications weighed by citations is presented. The
logic of regression 1 is to use the full information about scientific publication to justify a set of
control variables to the selection regressions 2 and 3. The over-dispersion parameter α is equal 3.7.
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Table 3.3: Estimation of Selection Equation
Neg. Binomial Heckman FIML
(1) (2) (3)
# Pub.Citation Pub.Likelihood Pub.Likelihood
Licensor Tech. Spec. 0.58 0.09 0.04
(0.35) (0.22) (0.21)
Licensor Patent Classes 0.08∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Licensor Experience 0.12∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Technology Complexity 0.76∗∗∗ 0.09 0.08
(0.14) (0.09) (0.07)
Competition 0.00 0.05 0.02
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Licensor Cash 0.13∗∗∗ 0.12 0.21
(0.04) (0.12) (0.18)
Licensor R&D Intensity -0.04 0.00 0.01
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
Licensor Size 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.02∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ATC1 (12 Dummies) Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
α 3.70
Log Likelihood -6563.34 -321.10 -2431.39
Observations 845 845 845
Note: For model 1, robust standard erros are in parentheses (clustered by licensor). For models 2 and 3,
Stata calculated and adjusted the standard erros jointly with Alliance Lag equations of Table 4.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Based on likelihood-ratio test, we reject the null hypothesis that α is equal 0 at 1% level of signifi-
cance, indicating that Negative Binomial regression, in which the conditional variance exceeds the
conditional mean, is more appropriate than the Poisson regression. Regression 1 suggests that big
licensors with more experience and cash publish more papers with higher impact that cites a specific
technology t or a targeted diseases d. Technological diversification measured by patent classes, and
technology complexity are also positive associated with higher number of publications.
Regressions 2 and 3 of Table 3.3 are respectively the Heckman and FIML selection equations
for the outcome equations 4 and 5 of Table 3.4. Both regressions, a Probit estimation of “Publication
Likelihood” of the licensor, present similar results. The selection equations have less regressors than
the outcome equations, because we assume that variables related to the licensee don’t affect the pub-
lishing probability of the licensor. Although the variable “Licensor Tech. Spec.” is not statistically
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significant, the significance of the variable “Licensor Patent Classes” indicates that patenting in dif-
ferent fields increases the probability of publication. Other variable associated with the probability
of publication is the “Licensor Size”. It might be the case that small firms have lower probability to
publish, because they need to send a stronger signal via patent instead of publication. Overall, the
selection regressions 2 and 3 indicate that selection problem is that relatively small firms with lower
scope (experience in different technical fields) is less likely to be in the sample of Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 presents the estimation of Alliance Lag equation. Regressions 1, 2, 3, estimate the
“Alliance Lag” by OLS independent of the selection equation; whereas regressions 4 and 5 esti-
mate “Alliance Lag” with the sample selection correction λ respectively by Heckman and FIML
estimators. All regressions control for ATC1 (12 anatomical therapeutic classes) and starting year
of the alliance. For models 1, 2, and 3, robust standard errors are clustered by licensee; whereas
for models 4, and 5, the standard errors were calculated, considering the estimation error of λ (the
sample selection correction variable). The results provide empirical support for H1 and H2. Related
to H1 that the licensor scientific and technological specialization speeds up the technological col-
laboration. For all regressions, the coefficients of “Licensor Sci. Spec.” and “Licensor Tech. Spec.”
are negative and statistically significant at 1%. Overall, each time that a set of control variables is
added from regression 1 to 3, the magnitude in absolute terms of the coefficients of “Licensor Sci.
Spec.” and “Licensor Tech. Spec.” decreases as part of variation is removed. Concerned H2 that
the licensee specialization doesn’t affect the timing of technological collaboration, the coefficients
of “Licensee Sci. Spec.” and “Licensor Tech. Spec.” are not statistically significant at even 10%.
Other evidences that supports H1 and H2 are respectively the positive and statistically significant
coefficient of “Licensor Patent Classes” and the non-statistically significant coefficient of “Licensee
Patent Classes”. The variable “Licensor Patent Classes” indicates that an increase of technologi-
cal diversification measured by patent classes delays the technological collaboration; whereas the
variable “Licensee Patent Classes” has no effect on the collaboration timing.
In regressions 4 and 5 of Table 3.4, the sample correction λ is statistically significant different
from zero at any p-value higher than 1%. Therefore, we cannot reject that the sample selection
correction is necessary. A pattern that can be noticed is that the magnitude in absolute terms of
“Licensor Sci. Spec.” from regressions 1 to 3 slightly decreases when compared to regressions 4
and 5. However, in the case of the variable “Licensor Tech. Spec.” the opposite occurs, that is, the
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Table 3.4: Estimation of Alliance Lag Equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS Heckman FIML
Licensor Sci. Spec. -7.30∗∗∗ -5.43∗∗∗ -4.23∗∗∗ -3.84∗∗∗ -3.94∗∗∗
(1.13) (0.98) (0.93) (1.38) (0.81)
Licensor Tech. Spec. -3.26∗∗∗ -3.61∗∗∗ -2.57∗∗∗ -3.97∗∗ -3.24∗∗∗
(1.12) (0.92) (0.82) (1.67) (0.85)
Licensee Sci. Spec. 1.51 -0.17 -0.39 0.01 0.22
(1.86) (1.50) (1.45) (2.08) (1.25)
Licensee Tech. Spec. 1.21 0.36 -0.75 -1.21 -1.07
(1.83) (1.52) (1.58) (2.11) (1.31)
Licensor Patent Classes 0.29∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Licensee Patent Classes -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Licensor Experience 0.32∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.16∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05)
Licensee Experience -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Prior Collaboration -0.31 -0.17 -0.19 -0.15
(0.50) (0.51) (0.74) (0.50)
Technology Complexity 0.79∗ 0.97∗∗ 0.87 0.92∗∗
(0.41) (0.40) (0.61) (0.39)
Competition -0.36 -0.16 -0.23 -0.23
(0.35) (0.34) (0.61) (0.35)
Equity Alliance -0.61 -0.52 -0.40 -0.44
(0.53) (0.51) (0.75) (0.47)
Licensor Cash 0.38∗∗ 0.37 0.36∗∗
(0.16) (0.24) (0.15)
Licensee Cash 0.05 0.06 0.03
(0.08) (0.14) (0.07)
Licensor R&D Intensity -0.32∗ -0.17 -0.26
(0.18) (0.35) (0.19)
Licensee R&D Intensity 1.41∗∗ 1.22∗ 1.42∗∗∗
(0.57) (0.73) (0.52)
Licensor Size 0.02 -0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)




ATC1 (12 Dummies) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.23 0.46 0.50
Log Likelihood -2280.76 -2159.55 -2135.51 -2431.39
Observations 679 679 679 845 845
Note: The variable λ (the inverse of the Mills’ ratio) is an adjustment for sample selection.
For models 1, 2, and 3, robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered by licensee).
For models 4 and 5, the standard errors in parentheses were calculated, considering the estimation error of λ.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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magnitude in absolute terms of “Licensor Patent” from regressions 4 to 5 increases to some extent
if compared to regressions 1 to 3. Our interpretation is that without sample correction, regression
1 to 3 overestimate the impact of “Licensor Sci. Spec.” and underestimate the impact of “Licensor
Tech. Spec.”, because firms that don’t publish are more likely to rely on patenting for signaling
purpose. Our preferred specification the Heckman Selection model, in which assumes less stronger
assumption about the error term, indicates that the impact of “Licensor Sci. Spec.” and “Licensor
Tech. Spec.” are equally relevant. Based on regression 4, we estimate that an increase of 10% in
the proportion of publication that cites a specific technology t or a targeted diseases d speeds up
the technological collaboration in about 4 months; whereas an increase of 10% in the proportion
of patent that cites a specific technology t or a targeted diseases d speeds up the technological
collaboration in about 5 months.
We are cautions to interpret the coefficients of control variables, because the most part are not
statistically significant and stable across different specifications. Therefore, we are going to focus
on the two variables that are statistically significant in the regression 4 and 5 of Table 3.4: “Licensor
Experience” and “Licensee R&D Intensity”. An increase of “Licensor Experience” is associated
with a delay on technological collaboration. One explanation is that relatively older and bigger li-
censors with higher experience in previous alliances prefer to cooperate late, in order to decrease the
uncertainty about the value of technology and to pressure for more beneficial division of the surplus.
Based on data from BiosciDB, we noticed that the licensor receives less royalties when the alliance
is signed in the early stage of drug development than late stages. Concerned to the “Licensee R&D
Intensity”, this variable is also associated with an increase of the collaboration timing. Some au-
thors [Katila and Mang (2003)] use R&D intensity as a proxy for absorptive capacity. Although
more R&D expenditure increases the capacity of the firm to identify, select, and use external tech-
nology, it is also increases his own in-house capabilities to develop the technology internally. The




After controlling for several factors at alliance and firm level, and selection issue, we showed that
licensor specialization speeds up the timing of technological collaboration. Based on our preferred
specification, we estimated that an increase of 10% in the scientific specialization speeds up the
technological collaboration in about 4 months; whereas an increase of 10% in the technological
specialization speeds up the technological collaboration in about 5 months. Furthermore, we found
that both licensee scientific specialization and licensee technological specialization in the same
technology or disease of the licensor don’t affect the timing of the technological collaboration. We
interpret these results as evidence that licensor has an important role in revealing information and
emitting the appropriate signal to decrease the problems of asymmetric information and uncertainty
around the market for technology.
Therefore, if policy makers want to accelerate the technological collaboration, licensor special-
ization should be incentivized instead of licensee specialization, avoiding the duplicity of resources
and exploring the comparative advantage of each party. For example, a R&D tax credit that targets
and concedes benefits to relatively small-medium specialist firms would have higher impact in the
total social welfare than an equalitarian policy that benefits large pharmaceutical firms that usually
are the buyer of the technology.
Other takeaway of this study is that licensor scientific specialization matters in similar way to
the licensor technological specialization. As biopharmaceutical sector is a very science-based sec-
tor, the labor division in scientific domain vs technological domain doesn’t match well with the
typology: nonprofit organizations vs firms. Therefore, a policy that assumes that scientific knowl-
edge is a public good and should be exclusively produced or allocated to nonprofit organizations
would probably delay the technological collaboration. Bibliometric studies [Koenig (1983), Rafols
et al. (2014)] indicate that scientific papers of pharmaceutical firms in basic biomedical research
(ex: pharmacology, biochemistry, molecular biology, and etc) are highly cited as research supported
by NIH (U.S. National Institutes of Health).
To better inform R&D policies, it would be important to investigate and to model the determi-
nants of scientific and technological specialization for example: environmental conditions at organi-
zation level or institutional factors at country level. Given the data restriction, this study focused on
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alliance formation in United States. It would be interesting to follow up and check the success rate
of alliances in other countries. Other interesting future research would be to test the same methodol-
ogy of restricting the scientific publications and patents that cite a specific technology to other high
tech sectors as software and semiconductor.
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CHAPTER 4
INNOVATION PRODUCTIVITY OF MAKING, ALLYING, AND
BUYING IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
4.1 Introduction
R&D portfolio of a pharmaceutical firm can be divided in three categories: 1) internal projects; 2)
projects developed in alliance with other firms; and 3) projects originated from M&A. The literature
[Pisano (1997), Danzon et al. (2005), Guedj (2005), Arora et al. (2009)] compared the innovative
performance of categories 1 and 2 under the dichotomy: make vs buy, or internal vs external R&D
projects. Somehow, the previous literature diluted category 3 in categories 1 and 2. However, a
snapshot of R&D portfolio of medium and big firms reveals that substantial part of R&D projects
comes from M&A. In fact, to bring new drugs to the market, managers have to consider the trade-
off among the three strategies: 1) to develop internally the R&D projects; 2) to develop the R&D
projects in cooperation with other firms, for example in-license the compound; and 3) to acquire a
bundle of R&D projects via M&A. For example, Novartis and GlaxoSmithKline exchange assets in
2014 to strengthen their area of expertise. Novartis acquired the oncology division of GlaxoSmithK-
line for $16 billion. In exchange, GlaxoSmithKline acquired the vaccines division from Novartis
for $7.1 billion.
Little attention was given to category 3, the exception was the finding of Grabowski and Kyle
(2008) that indicates that post-merger projects have higher probability of success than pre-merger
projects. Differently from Grabowski and Kyle (2008) that compared the R&D projects before and
after the M&A, the goal of this study is to compare the innovation performance at intra-project level
based on three different sources: internal, alliance, and M&A.
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Furthermore, the literature [Pisano (1997), Danzon et al. (2005), Guedj (2005), Arora et al.
(2009)] provides a mixed evidence about the impact of alliances on innovation productivity. Pisano
(1997), Guedj (2005) found that collaborative projects have higher failure rate than vertically inte-
grated projects in the pharmaceutical industry. Specifically, Guedj (2005) found that collaborative
projects have higher success rate in moving from Phase I to Phase II, but lower success rate in mov-
ing from Phase II to Phase III and in receiving FDA approval. The explanation of Pisano (1997) is
that Biotechs develop internally the best compounds and license-out the “lemons” compounds. In
the same line of reasoning, Guedj (2005) complements that Biotechs advances low quality projects
in the early clinical trials, in order to avoid a negative signal that would jeopardize the access of
funding. However, Danzon et al. (2005) found that in-licensed compounds have higher success rate
than in-house compounds. According to the Danzon et al. (2005), licensee’s experience in drug
development increases the success rate, specially the phase III, which is more complex and expen-
sive. Arora et al. (2009) found that in-licensed compounds have the same probability of success as
in-house compounds. According to the Arora et al. (2009), comparing to big Pharmas, Biotech has
lower probability to receive FDA approval, not because of “lemons” problem, but because Biotechs
have on average lower quality compounds.
One main contribution of this study is to rationalize the conflicting findings in the previous liter-
ature about innovation productivity of internal R&D projects vs external R&D projects, controlling
explicitly for M&A. This study found that if external R&D projects are defined as projects developed
in research alliance and projects originated from M&A, there is no difference between the proba-
bility of success of internal R&D projects and external R&D projects. However, when the external
R&D projects is split in a relevant category research alliance and M&A, R&D projects developed by
research alliance have higher probability of success than internal R&D projects, but R&D projects
originated from M&A have lower probability of success than internal R&D projects. This study
also found that the probability of success of research alliance and M&A depends positively on who
is the partner or the targeted firm. Research alliances between big pharmaceutical firms have higher
probability of success than research alliances, in which one part is a small or medium firm. In the
same line, R&D projects originated from a big scale M&A has higher probability of success than
from small scale M&A (usually small Biotechs, example of vertical M&A). Furthermore, the re-
sults suggest that despite the firms strategically use external R&D to strengthen the R&D portfolio
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in a specific ATC1 or diversify to different ATC1, these strategies are not predictors of innovation
performance.
4.2 Literature Review
What are the trade-offs among making, allying, and buying? Economic theory suggests that firms
ally or buy technology if gains from trade more than compensate transaction costs and asymmetric
information problems, such as moral hazard and adverse selection. Ultimately, it is an empirical
question if gains from trade dominates or not the loss due transaction costs and asymmetric infor-
mation problems.
Previous literature [Pisano (1997), Danzon et al. (2005), Guedj (2005), Arora et al. (2009)]
compared the innovation performance between making and allying without controlling explicitly for
M&A (buying). They don’t have a variable that marks the R&D projects acquired via M&A. They
compute substantial part of R&D projects originated by M&A in the category in-house projects,
because the organizations (Thomson Reuters, Citeline, Adis International, and etc), who compile
information about R&D projects, update the datasets in a way that the targeted firm was always part
of the acquiring firm. Little attention was given to the innovation performance of R&D projects
originated from M&A. The exception was the study of Grabowski and Kyle (2008) that indicates
that post-merger projects have higher probability of success than pre-merger projects, controlling
only for firm size. It is not clear that result is robust for other controls such as: therapeutic class,
innovativeness, risk, chemical/biologic compound, firm and time fixed effects. The problem is that
the treatment variable (M&A) cannot be randomized, but it is firms’ choice, and it is hard to find a
reliable counterfactual to make the comparison between pre and post-merger.
Concerned to the comparison between innovation performance of making and allying, the liter-
ature provides mixed evidence. With an old and small sample of 260 biotechnology projects, Pisano
(1997) found that collaborative projects have lower success rate than vertically integrated projects.
Pisano (1997) argues that Biotechs take advantage of asymmetric information and license-out the
“lemons” compounds. In a sample of 4057 R&D projects initiated by 40 big pharmaceutical firms
between 1984-2001, Guedj (2005) found that research alliance projects have higher success rate in
moving from Phase I to Phase II, but lower success rate in moving from Phase II to Phase III and
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in receiving FDA approval. Guedj (2005) estimates that research alliance projects (represents about
10% of the sample) are 10% less likely to receive FDA approval than internal projects. The expla-
nation of Guedj (2005) for this result is that entrepreneurs of Biotechs have personal incentives to
continue low quality projects in the early clinical trials, in order to keep raising external funding;
whereas managers of internal projects in a Big Pharma take decisions about project continuation
based on scientific, clinical and financial criteria. In fact, financial constraints affect the perfor-
mance of alliances. In a sample of 200 R&D alliances, Lerner et al. (2003) found that alliances
signed under periods of limited equity financing are less successful in generating drug approval
than alliances signed during favorable financing conditions.
However, in a sample of about 1900 compounds developed by over 900 firms between 1988 to
2000, Danzon et al. (2005) found that in-licensed compounds (represents about 50% of the sample)
have higher success rate than in-house compounds. It is worth mentioning that the variable “in-
licensed compounds” of Danzon et al. (2005) includes any sort of alliance signed in phase 1, 2,
and 3, such as marketing and distribution agreements. According to the Danzon et al. (2005),
licensee’s experience in drug development increases the success rate, especially phase III, which is
more complex and expensive. For Danzon et al. (2005), the gains of trade more than compensate
the potential negative effects of moral hazard and adverse selection.
In a sample of over 3000 R&D projects initiated by 329 firms between 1980 and 1994, Arora
et al. (2009) found that in-licensed compounds (represents about 8% of the sample) have the same
probability of success as in-house compounds, controlling for firm type, scale, scope, economic
selection (market size, and market competition), ATC, and diseases characteristics. Arora et al.
(2009) added that comparing to big Pharmas, Biotechs have on average lower quality compounds.
In this case, lower probability of success of compounds originated by Biotechs can be explained
by the average lower quality instead of assuming that Biotechs are on purpose dumping “lemons”
compounds to Big Pharmas.
4.3 Hypothesis
Research alliances allow firms to explore complementary technology, expertise, research tools and
material, that are not available in-house repertoire. Given the fast pace of technological change,
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even for a big firm with stronger research capability like Merck, it might be more cost effective and
less risky to learn by collaboration than trying to develop all the capabilities internally [Arora and
Gambardella (1990), Gambardella (1992)]. As alliance is a long term targeted effort, the synergy
created by a combination of different capabilities and resources tends to overcome the transaction
costs and asymmetric information problems. Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated:
Hypothesis 1a: R&D projects developed by research alliance have higher innovation performance
than R&D projects developed internally.
Firms might face lower transaction cost and less asymmetric information problems, if they have
stronger experience (measured by previous drug approval) in the same ATC1 of the research al-
liance. Although the big pharmaceutical firms have internal or external R&D projects in almost
all ATC1, they are specialized and have comparative advantage in certain ATC1. For example,
based on in-house R&D program, Pfizer has comparative advantage in ATC N (Nervous System);
whereas Merck has comparative advantage in ATC A (Alimentary Tract and Metabolism). Proba-
bly, a biotech or other firm would have more incentives to dump a “lemon” on Pfizer in ATC A than
ATC N.
Hypothesis 1b: Horizontal research alliances have higher innovation performance than vertical
research alliances.
Several authors claim that small biotech firms are more innovative than big pharmaceutical firms.
A flexible structure with more freedom and less bureaucracy would foster creativity. In fact, small
firms have more patents and publication normalized by total assets. However, in the pharmaceutical
industry, it is necessary to distinguish between invention and innovation. From invention (patents)
to innovation (bring the drug to the market), there is a long shot, that is, the compound has to
pass the clinical trials, showing safety and efficacy, and this process can last several years. Other
authors [Pisano (1997), Guedj (2005)] claim that biotech firms keep the higher quality compounds
and dump the lower quality compounds on big pharmaceutical firms. Arora et al. (2009) found
that big pharmaceutical firms are more innovative than small biotech firms, because on average
the first has higher quality compounds than the second. Furthermore, a partnership between two
big firms might be more successful because of the higher probability of combining complementary
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capabilities and resources, and both parties might have less incentives to “free ride”, in order to
preserve the reputation. Therefore, the following hypothesis states that the partner size affects the
innovation performance of a research alliance.
Hypothesis 1c: Research alliances with a big firm have higher innovation performance than re-
search alliances with a small-medium firm.
Quite often, M&A is described in the literature as short term solution for a more structural problem
related to the R&D pipeline crisis [Higgins and Rodriguez (2006)]. For antitrust purpose, firms
often claim that M&A creates economies of scale and scope at R&D level, but some authors sug-
gest [Mittra (2007)] a diseconomies in basic research and potentially economies at marketing and
distribution level. M&A might also have other rationality than buying R&D projects or technology
not available in-house. Firms might use M&A to promote organizational change, in order to reduce
operating cost and to shut down inefficient units or operations. According with a case study of
Mittra (2006), firms might also engage in M&A to access global markets (Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz
in 1996, Rhone-Poulenc Rorer and HoechstAG in 1999; and Sanofi and Aventis in 2004). The lit-
erature didn’t pay much attention, but M&A can be employed to obtain tax advantage, to write-off
extremely large expenses, and to change the tax domicile. Therefore, the following hypothesis is
formulated:
Hypothesis 2a: R&D projects acquired via M&A have lower innovation performance than R&D
projects developed internally.
Given a specific M&A, some acquired R&D projects might belong to the ATC1, in which the firm
has stronger experience (previously drug approval) and others not. Based on the same logic of hor-
izontal and vertical research alliances, R&D projects that explore higher level of complementarity
and strengthen the ATC1, in which the firm is specialized, are more likely to be successful. Instead
of relying on organic growth, firms might diversify and acquire R&D projects in ATC1 outside
their core competence [Arora and Gambardella (1990)]. In fact, there is also complementarity or
economies of scope between different ATC. It is an empirical question what M&A has higher inno-
vation performance, vertical or horizontal. However, transaction costs and asymmetric information
might be more problematic in the case of vertical M&A, in which firms are acquiring R&D projects
outside of their core competence. Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated:
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Hypothesis 2b: R&D projects originated from horizontal M&A have higher innovation perfor-
mance than vertical M&A.
Based on the same rationality of hypothesis 1c, R&D projects originated from a big firm, that is,
a big M&A (more than 100 R&D projects and the deal over U$ 1 Billion) might have on average
higher probability of success than R&D projects originated from small firms (Biotechs). Several
factors might explain this difference in innovation performance, but it looks that R&D portfolio of
big firms is on average higher quality than small firms. It is worth mentioning that if small M&A is
often related to technology acquisition, big M&A is usually driven by a set of different rationality
as described previously. In this line of reasoning, R&D projects originated from small M&A should
have higher probability of success than R&D projects originated from big M&A, but it might be the
case that several big firms use M&A to buy specific research tools or material to be incorporated
to their own R&D projects instead of developing the R&D projects of Biotechs. Therefore, the
following hypothesis is formulated:
Hypothesis 2c: R&D projects acquired via big M&A have higher innovation performance than
small M&A.
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Data Source and Sample
The main data source is the Pharmaprojects database from Citeline, an organization that claims to be
the world’s most comprehensive source of real-time R&D intelligence for the pharmaceutical indus-
try. Pharmaprojects tracks drugs pipeline since 1980, covering all stages of drug development from
discovery through clinical trials to drug approval and commercialization. Besides providing a de-
tailed development history timeline of over 60,000 drug profiles, Pharmaprojects includes licensing
and sponsoring organization details together with a description of the disease, therapy, mechanism,
delivery routes, chemical data and molecular structure.
To keep the sample homogeneous and focus on firms that engage in research alliance and M&A,
the sample is restricted to 32 firms with highest number of R&D projects among 1980 to 2014. Only
new chemical entity (NCE) and biologic compounds are included in the sample. R&D projects
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without a well-defined chemical or biological molecular structure were eliminated, such as natural
product originated by animals and plants. The sample is also restricted to R&D projects with enter-
ing date from 1989 to 2007, in order to mitigate the left and right censoring problems. For example,
left censoring occurs when drug approval is reported but with no information about clinical trials
or the project starting date. Right censoring happens in the case of no information about project
success or failure, although it is known that the R&D project started or passed some clinical trials.
Furthermore, the lower bound 1989 is chosen because Citeline started a more systematic and stan-
dardized data collection after 1988 and most part of observations occurred after this date. The upper
bound is chosen because the development of R&D projects take long time, and if R&D projects
started in 2008 to 2014 were included, the rate of failure would be biased upward.
Other datasets used for this study are LexisNexis® Academic, the Pharmaceutical Market from
OECD (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), and MalaCards from
Weizmann Institute of Science in Israel. The first is an online database with legal and business
information from over 17,000 sources that it is used to generate a list of M&A. The second database
is used to construct the variable Market Size for 9 ATC (Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classifi-
cation System) level 1: A (Alimentary tract and metabolism), B (Blood and blood forming organs),
C (Cardiovascular system, G (Genito-urinary system and sex hormones), H (Systemic hormonal
preparations), J (Antiinfectives), M (Musculo-skeletal system), N (Nervous system), and R (Res-
piratory system). The third is a searchable database of over 18,864 human disease entries from 64
consolidated sources that it is used to classify diseases from Pharmaproject in categories such as:
Cancer, Rare (or Orphan Disease), Genetic, and Infectious.
The final sample has 14,861 observations, 9,201 R&D projects, 710 different indications/diseases
in the most disaggregate level, 14 ATC level 1 (group of organ/system like M - Musculo-skeletal
system), and 147 ATC level 2 (indication like M05 - Drugs for treatment of bone diseases, ex: Os-
teoporosis). Although the most part of variation is at R&D project level given how the data was
collected and overwritten by Citeline, the unit of analysis is a specific indication as Danzon et al.
(2005), Arora et al. (2009). For example, the R&D project or compound Sildenafil (Trademark:
Viagra) developed by Pfizer targeted four indications: 1) male erectile dysfunction; 2) pulmonary
arterial hypertension; 3) female sexual dysfunction; and 4) surgery adjunct. Each indication had to
pass a separate clinical trial and in this case only indications 1 and 2 were successful in receiving
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Approval 14861 0.046 0.21 0 1
External 14861 0.59 0.49 0 1
Research Alliance 14861 0.14 0.35 0 1
M&A 14861 0.53 0.50 0 1
Vertical Alliance 14861 0.060 0.24 0 1
Horizontal Alliance 14861 0.082 0.27 0 1
Alliance_Small_Firm 14861 0.092 0.29 0 1
Alliance_Big_Firm 14861 0.051 0.22 0 1
Vertical M&A 14861 0.19 0.39 0 1
Horizontal M&A 14861 0.27 0.44 0 1
Small M&A 14861 0.15 0.36 0 1
Big M&A 14861 0.30 0.46 0 1
Biologic 14861 0.19 0.39 0 1
Innovation Index 14861 0.30 0.31 0.053 1
# of Diseases by Project 14861 3.10 3.59 1 29
University Project 14861 0.019 0.14 0 1
Vaccine 14861 0.042 0.20 0 1
Scale Firm 14861 3.67 0.86 0 5.00
Scope Firm 14861 10.6 3.13 2 14
Risk Portfolio 14861 0.93 0.039 0.39 1
Screening Ratio 14861 0.43 0.21 0 1
Cancer 14861 0.20 0.40 0 1
Rare 14861 0.046 0.21 0 1
Genetic 14861 0.16 0.37 0 1
Infectious 14861 0.14 0.35 0 1
Competition 14861 23.3 24.3 0 119
Market Size 12010 12.5 6.29 1.94 32.1
approval from regulatory authority. Therefore, each indication is considered as a separate R&D
project.
4.4.2 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are presented in Table 4.1. The dependent variable “Approval” is coded 1 if the
indication was approved by any regulatory authority in the world, and 0 otherwise. About 4.6% of
indications was successful in receiving approval from regulatory authority.
The variable of interest “External” is coded 1 if the R&D project was originated/developed by
research alliance or M&A, and 0 if the R&D project was completely developed in-house. External
R&D and Internal R&D represent respectively 60% and 40% of total R&D projects. Each R&D
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project was classified as research alliance or M&A based on project description (field “Overview”)
and several other fields from Pharmaprojects, and a list of M&A from LexisNexis® Academic. For
example, the blockbuster drug Enbrel indicated for arthritis, ankylosing spondylitis, and psoriasis
was coded as research alliance not only because the field “Originator” and “Licensee” had respec-
tively the names “Amgen” and “Pfizer/Takeda/Sanofi”, but the project description used the words
“jointly developed”:
“Etanercept (Enbrel) is a soluble recombinant human p75 tumour necrosis factor
(TNF) receptor and human IgG1 Fc portion fusion protein produced in a mammalian
cell expression system, jointly developed by Receptech (Amgen; previously Immunex)
and Wyeth Pharmaceuticals (Wyeth (Pfizer) (formerly Wyeth-Ayerst (American Home
Products (AHP)) for the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis (RA) and other inflammatory
conditions ...”
Quite often, there were many firms in the “Licensee” field, but no reference in the project descrip-
tion field for words like “co-developed”, “joint venture”, joint developed, and etc. In this case,
“Licensee” is less likely to be a research alliance and more likely to be a marketing, promotion, or
distribution agreement, what can be confirmed by descriptions in the fields “Marketing” and “Li-
censing” from Pharmaprojects. In the project description field, it is also possible to track M&A. For
example, Receptech was a subsidiary of Immunex, in which was acquired by Amgen in 2002; and
American Home Products was renamed to Wyeth in 2002 and was acquired by Pfizer in 2009.
The variable “Research Alliance” indicates that 14% of the R&D projects were developed in
research alliance, a percentage slightly higher than described by Guedj (2005), Arora et al. (2009),
but substantial lower than 50% informed by Danzon et al. (2005). Following Guedj (2005), Arora
et al. (2009), this study focus on research alliance; whereas Danzon et al. (2005) included market-
ing, promotion, and distribution agreement under the variable “Alliance”. The variable “Research
Alliance” was split in other four variables “Vertical Alliance” vs “Horizontal Alliance”, and “Al-
liance_Small_Firm” vs “Alliance_Big_Firm”. The variable “Vertical Alliance” indicates that the
research alliance was formed in a ATC1, in which a firm has no drug approval originated by in-
ternal R&D; whereas the variable “Horizontal Alliance” indicates that the research alliance was
formed in an ATC1, in which a firm has already a drug approval originated by internal R&D. The
variable “Alliance_Big_Firm” was coded as 1, if the licensee was one of the 32 biggest firms in
terms or R&D projects, and 0 otherwise. The variable “Alliance_Small_Firm” was coded as 1, if
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the licensee wasn’t the one of the 32 biggest firms in terms or R&D projects, and 0 otherwise.
R&D projects originated from M&A represent 53% of the sample. Although the specialized
literature [Danzon et al. (2005), Guedj (2005), Arora et al. (2009)] doesn’t control explicitly for
M&A, Danzon et al. (2005) recognizes that the omission might introduce measurement error in
the variable of interest. The variable “M&A” was also split in four variables “Vertical M&A” vs
“Horizontal M&A”, and “Small M&A” vs “Big M&A”. The variable “Vertical M&A” indicates that
the firm acquired R&D project in the ATC1, in which the firm had no drug approval originated
by internal R&D; whereas the variable “Horizontal M&A” indicates that the firm acquired R&D
project in the ATC1, in which the firm had at least one drug approval originated by internal R&D.
The variables “Small M&A” and “Big M&A” were created based on the size of M&A, that is, big
M&A was defined as the acquisition of more than one hundred R&D projects and the value of
targeted firm above U$ 1 billion; whereas the small M&A was the opposite.
Fig 1 presents the Top 7 Drug Sales of Pfizer and Merck in 2013 by R&D Project Source.
Among the big pharmaceutical firms, Merck has the reputation of having stronger internal R&D
capabilities; whereas Pfizer has the reputation of relying stronger on external R&D. According with
Fig 1, even Merck relays considerable on external R&D. Among the top 7 drug sales in 2013,
Merck developed 3 drugs internally: Januvia, Janumet, and Isentress. Zetia and Nasonex were
developed by Schering-Plough, a firm acquired by Merck in 2009. Gardasil was developed in col-
laboration with the University of Queensland in Australia. Vytorin was developed in joint-venture
with Schering-Plough before the acquisition of Schering-Plough by Merck. Among the top 7 drug
sales in 2013, Pfizer only developed internally the Viagra. Lyrica was developed by Parke-Davis, a
firm acquired by Warner–Lambert in 1970, which in turn was acquired by Pfizer in 2000. Prevnar
was developed by Wyeth, a firm acquired by Pfizer in 2000. Celebrex was developed by Searle,
a firm acquired by Monsanto in 1985 and merged with Pharmacia & Upjohn in 1999, which in
turn was acquired by Pfizer in 2003. Lipitor was developed by Warner–Lambert, a firm acquired
by Pfizer in 2000. Zyvox was developed by Pharmacia, a firm merged with Upjohn in 1999 and
acquired by Pfizer in 2003. Enbrel was jointly developed by Immunex and Wyeth. Immunex was
acquired by Amgen in 2002; whereas Wyeth was acquired by Pfizer in 2000.
The control variables at project level are: Biologic, Innovation Index, # of Diseases by Project,






































































Top 7 Drug Sales of Pfizer and Merck in 2013
Alliance Internal
M&A
Source: Merck (2014), Pfizer (2014)
Figure 4.1: Top 7 Drug Sales of Pfizer and Merck in 2013 by R&D Project Source
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by living organism (such as yeast, bacteria, and etc) and not made by chemical synthesis (small
molecules), and 0 otherwise. About 20% of compounds is biological and this proportion has been in-
creasing during the years. The variable “Innovation Index” was constructed based on Guedj (2005)
and aims to ranking R&D projects in terms of chronological use of drug’s mechanism of action in
the body. For example, the pharmacological mechanism of Enbrel is “tumour necrosis factor alpha
antagonist”. This mechanism of action was already used in another R&D project started in 1989, in
which received rank 1. As Enbrel project started in 1990, it received rank 2. R&D projects that used
the same mechanism and started in 1991 and 1992 received respectively rank 3 and 4, and so on.
The variable “Innovation Index” is the inverse of the chronological rank, therefore the maximum
value 1 represents that the firms used the most state of art technology/knowledge available when
the project started, and the minimum value in the sample .053 indicates that the project used an old
technique/knowledge described in the pharmacological literature. The variable “# of Diseases by
Project” might captures different factors such as spillover between therapeutic class, project size,
and unobservable quality of the project. For example, Enbrel project targets 18 indications in 9
different therapeutic class. The variable “University Project” is coded 1 if a university or non-profit
research institute formally participate in R&D project, and 0 otherwise. Only 2% of R&D projects
has a participation of a university or non-profit research institute. However, the literature [Ward
and Dranove (1995), McMillan et al. (2000), Zucker et al. (2002), Stuart et al. (2007)] points out
for the importance of the upstream inputs (patents, human capital, star scientist, research tools, and
etc) as source of competitive advantage in the discovery phase of drug development. The variable
“Vaccine” is coded 1 if the project is developing a vaccine, and 0 otherwise. Only 4.2% of projects
are developing a vaccine.
The control variables at firm level are: Scale Firm, Scope Firm, Risk Portfolio, and Screening
Ratio. The variable “Scale Firm” is the total number of R&D projects per year by the firm. The
variable “Scope Firm” is the number of ATC1, in which the firm obtained at least one drug approval
from 1989 to 2014. Firms such as Kyowa Hakko Kirin, Servier, and Shire, only obtained drug
approval in two different ATC1; whereas only two firms Novartis and Sanofi obtained drug approval
in all 14 ATC1. The variable “Risk Portfolio” is the mean of diseases attrition rate per year by firm.
Each disease has a historical attrition rate, for some diseases there are several approved drugs, but for
others zero. The maximum value 1 for this variable means that in certain year a firm started projects
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targeting diseases without any drug approval. The minimum value .389 means that a firm carried a
low risk portfolio targeting diseases that is relatively easy to receive drug approval. The mean of this
variable indicates that typical portfolio carries projects with 92% probability of fail. The variable
“Screening Ratio” follows Danzon et al. (2005), and it is the percentage of projects that a firm takes
into clinical trial by year. A lower screening ratio means that a firm might be very selective and
discontinue projects before the clinical trial. By the other hand, higher screening ratio indicates that
firm might advance even project with poor prospect to the clinical trial. Alternative explanation
is that lower screening ratio indicates poor quality R&D portfolio; whereas higher screening ratio
indicates that the firm has stronger innovation capabilities with several higher quality R&D projects
in the discovery phase. About 43% of all projects starts phase 1 of clinical trial, that is, the most
part of R&D projects is terminated before the compound being test in human beings.
The control variables at diseases level are: Cancer, Rare, Genetic and Infectious. They are
dummy variables and non-mutually exclusive categories. Besides controlling for ATC1 and ATC2,
this study control for a group of diseases that supersede the taxonomy based on anatomy, such as
cancer that can be in any therapeutic class.
For robustness checks, two more variables are used: Competition and Market Size. The variable
“Competition” is the logarithm of the total number of drug approval +1 during 1980 to 2014 for a
specific condition (diseases). The variable “Market Size” is the logarithm of drug sales by ATC1
in six countries without missing values between 1989-2007: Finland, France, Germany, Japan,
Netherlands, and Switzerland. All sales data was in U$ dollars (Billions) and was adjusted for
inflation base year 2007, using the CPI (Consumer Price Index) provided by US Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Unfortunately, OECD doesn’t have data for United States, the biggest market. Dubois
et al. (2015) point out that both variables are related and might affect the innovation rate in a non-
linear way or the causality might be in both direction. A large expected market size creates more
incentives for innovation, but innovation also creates market size. Competition decreases the profits,
what can decrease the incentives to innovate, but firms might respond to competition with more
innovation, in order to create a new market and profits. A large market size also induces entry
(more competition), then a disease with a large market size with many competitors might be less
profitable than an orphan disease with a lower market size and few competitors.
Table 4.2 reports the probability of drug approval for each R&D source. Internal and External
79




Research Alliance 2112 0.074
M&A 6702 0.041
Vertical Alliance 895 0.080
Horizontal Alliance 1217 0.069
Alliance_Small_Firm 1361 0.036
Alliance_Big_Firm 751 0.14
Vertical M&A 2762 0.036
Horizontal M&A 3940 0.044
Small-Medium M&A 2255 0.028
Big M&A 4447 0.047
source have slightly different probability of success respectively 4.2% and 4.9%, and this difference
is not statistically significant. However, when the variable “External” is split in different categories,
higher variation in the probability of success rate appears. The probability of drug approval for re-
search alliance and M&A is respectively 7.4% and 4.1%. When the variable “Research Alliance” is
split in “Vertical Alliance” and “Horizontal Alliance”, the difference (1.1%) between probability of
success is not very high, but if the variable “Research Alliance” is split in “Alliance_Small_Firm”
and “Alliance_Big_Firm”, the difference (10.4%) between probability of success is very significa-
tive. About 1/3 of research alliances is between big firms and the probability of drug approval of
these alliances is 14%; whereas research alliances with small firms (licensee is not one of 32 biggest
firms in terms of R&D projects) have probability of drug approval of 3.6%. Similar to the variable
“Research Alliance”, when the variable “M&A” is split in “Vertical M&A” and “Horizontal M&A”,
the difference (0.8%) between probability of success is not very high. If the variable “M&A” is split
in “Small M&A” and “Big M&A”, the difference (1.9%) between probability of success is not very
substantial either. However, the pattern of splitting the variables “Research Alliance” and “M&A”
suggests that the size of the firm matters more than the strategic decision about specialization vs
diversification for the success rate of drug approval.
Next section will show that these differences in the probability of drug approval remain even
after controlling for a set of control variables described previously in this section.
Table 4.3 reports the correlation between variables. There is no evidence of multicollinearity
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problem. Overall, the sign of coefficients match with the results in the next section.
4.5 Empirical Strategy
Equation 4.1 represents the basic specification to test the difference of innovation productivity
among R&D projects originated/developed by internal R&D, alliance, and M&A.
Approvalpfay = β0 + β1Alliancepfay + β2M&Apfay + θiXpfay + φf +αa + γy + εpfay (4.1)
The dependent variable, Approvalpfay, is a dummy variable that captures the success/failure of
the project p, by firm f , in anatomical therapeutic chemical class a, initiate in year y. This dummy
variable has value of 1 if the drug was approved by any regulatory authority in the world, and 0
otherwise.
The independent variables of interest are: Alliancepfay and M&Apfay. The category base
is internal project. Therefore, the project p could be originated/developed by internal R&D, or
external R&D (research alliance or M&A). For example, Alliancepfay and M&Apfay are respec-
tively dummy variables that have value 1 if the project was developed/originated in alliance/M&A
with/from another firm, and get the value 0 otherwise.
The vector of control variables is represented by Xpfay, in which θis are the different coef-
ficients for each control variable. A set of control variables at project level p and firm level f is
tested and described in details in the summary statistics. The logic is to show that after controlling
for several important factors described in the literature, the variation in innovation productivity can
only be explained by R&D sources.
As usual, φf are dummies for firms, αa are dummies for Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical
(ATC), γy are dummies for years, and εpfay is the error term. Part of variation of innovation pro-
ductivity is firm specific, for example how they organize R&D program, combine internal R&D with
external R&D, explore spillovers from basic science, and design incentives to the scientists. Specif-
ically, firms self-select R&D strategies, in which they can create more value. Merck is known to
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































As unobserved factors to the econometrician affect firm’s decision among making, allying, and buy-
ing, the impact of the variablesAlliancepfay andM&Apfay might be interpreted conditioned firms
decide to engage in alliances and M&A. However, these unobserved factors are likely to be firm
specific and can be controlled by firm dummies. The idea is to show that results are not driven by a
specific firm or heterogeneity among firms.
Different ATCs also present different drug approval rates. ATC classes vary in terms of prof-
itability, market size, competition, opportunity technology, and etc. Therefore, it is important to
control for ATC class, mitigating the possibility that some unobserved factor biases the results. As
robustness checks, this study will control for higher ATC level and the most possible disaggregate
level, that is, disease level.
Finally, a set of time dummies is used to control for external shocks, some disruptive techno-
logical change that could affect the innovation productivity, R&D cycle, or trends, for example, the
literature point outs a “productivity crisis” in the past 30 years, in which firms have been spending
more and more in R&D each year, but the number of drug approval has been decreasing [DiMasi
et al. (2003), DiMasi and Grabowski (2007)].
Someone might argue that there is a reverse causality between the dependent variable,Approvalpfay,
and the independent variable, Alliancepfay. This potential source of endogeneity is unlikely to be
a problem in this study, because of the long lag between research alliance and drug approval. Re-
search alliance usually happens in the discovery phase, several years before the drug approval. The
future expectation of drug approval may affect the alliance formation. However, we control for sev-
eral factors related to the expectation of drug approval, such as ATC classes, diseases, market size,
and risk portfolio.
Equation 4.1 can be estimated by assuming nonlinear model (discrete choice model as Probit)
and OLS (Linear Probability Model). It is assumed that unobserved factors are not correlated with
the variables of interest. As robustness checks, several variations of equation 4.1 are estimated in
the result section. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm level.
We also split the variable: 1) Alliancepfay in “Vertical Alliance” vs “Horizontal Alliance”, and
in “Alliance_Small_Firm” vs “Alliance_Big_Firm”; 2) M&Apfay in “Vertical M&A” vs “Horizon-
tal M&A”, and in “Small M&A” vs “Big M&A”. We estimated the relative innovation performance
of the 4 groups using the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method [Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983),
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Dehejia and Wahba (2002), Cameron and Trivedi (2005), Abadie and Imbens (2016)]. PSM is an
inexact matching estimator designed to deal with observational data. The matching is not made
directly on the vector of control variables Xpfay, but made on the propensity score, p(x), the condi-
tional probability of receiving theatment given the control variables Xpfay. As the vector of control
variables Xpfay has a high dimension, and is composed by several continuous variables, the PSM
is the most appropriate matching technique for this study. However, other matching techniques like
Nearest-Neighbor Matching estimator (NNME) don’t change the results. The advantage of PSM
over OLS is the less restrictive functional form for identification, but it requires bigger sample size.
To identify the population-average treatment effect on the treated (ATET), it is necessary to as-
sume the overlap assumption. For example, for each propensity score of “Vertical Alliance”, there is
another similar propensity score of “Horizontal Alliance”. Propensity scores were generated using a
Probit model. Concerned to the number of matches per observation, there is a tradeoff between bias
and variance [Cameron and Trivedi (2005)]. Higher number of matches per observation decreases
the variance, but it also increases the probability of inferior matches. To minimize the bias, only one
match per observation was allowed. The robust standard errors were derived by Abadie and Imbens
(2006, 2012).
4.6 Results
Table 4.4 reports the probit estimates for the probability of drug approval. Robust standard errors
are clustered by firms for all regressions. Firm, disease group (cancer, rare, genetic and infectious),
ATC1, and year dummies are presented in all regressions. Column 1 shows that the probability
of drug approval of external R&D projects is not statistically different compared to internal R&D
projects, the reference category. Column 2 shows that even controlling for a set of variables at
project and firm level, the result of column 1 remains. Both results are aligned with Arora et al.
(2009) who claim that internal projects have the same probability of success as licensed projects.
However, when the variable of interest “External” is split in “Research Alliance” and “M&A” in
columns 3 to 5, a consistent pattern indicates that research alliances have higher probability of drug
approval than internal R&D projects; whereas R&D projects acquired by M&A have lower proba-
bility of success than internal R&D projects. The results of Table 4.4 also contradict Pisano (1997),
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Guedj (2005) who claim that internal projects have higher probability of success than projects de-
veloped in research alliance. One explanation for the results obtained by Arora et al. (2009), Pisano
(1997), Guedj (2005) is that these studies don’t control explicitly for M&A, therefore their esti-
mations of the impact of research alliance are likely to be downward biased as suggested by the
statistically significant negative coefficient of “M&A” in regressions 3 to 5.
Concerned the control variables at R&D project level, regressions 2, 4, and 5 show that bio-
logic compounds have higher probability to receive drug approval than small molecules (chemical
compounds). Some authors suggest that biologic compounds embody higher level of innovation,
even though the cost and time for development is similar to the chemical compounds [DiMasi et al.
(2003), DiMasi and Grabowski (2007), Trusheim et al. (2010)]. The coefficient of “Innovation In-
dex” is not statistically significant. As the sample is restricted to the new chemical entity (NCE) and
biologic compounds, there is no much variation in terms of innovativeness captured by the variable
“Innovation Index”. The coefficient of “# of Diseases by Project” is positive and statistically signif-
icant. This variable is likely to captures size, spillovers between ATC1, and unobservable quality of
R&D projects. Very similar variable was created, the number of ATC1 by project, and the results
remain the same. The coefficient of “University Project” is negative and statistically significant, but
it is not statistically significant in the robustness checks of Table 4.5. Several authors [Cockburn and
Henderson (1998), Zucker et al. (2002), Stuart et al. (2007)] claim that proximity to basic science
measured by star scientists, publication, and partnership with universities foster innovation. There
is some empirical evidence that spillovers from basic science matter for invention such as number
of patents, but in the pharmaceutical industry there is a long shot between invention and innovation.
Some studies [Schulze and Ringel (2013), Roland et al. (2015)] state that first to patent is not a
predictor to get drug approval or the best drug in class. The coefficient “Vaccine” is not statistically
significant, but it is worth mentioning that 98% of vaccine in the sample is classified as biologic
compound.
Related to control variables at firm level, regressions 2 and 5 indicate that economies of scale
doesn’t explain differences in innovation productivity. However, this variable is important in stud-
ies [Danzon et al. (2005), Arora et al. (2009)] that have hundreds of small firms (biotechs) in the
sample. As the sample of this study is composed only by big pharmaceutical firms, it might be
the case that the firms are operating in an optimal scale or that size matters only at project level
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Table 4.4: Baseline Estimation for the Probability of Drug Approval
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
External 0.02 -0.06
(0.08) (0.07)
Research Alliance 0.31∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
M&A -0.15∗ -0.22∗∗ -0.22∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Biologic 0.31∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Innovation Index 0.08 0.04 0.08
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
# of Diseases by Project 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
University Project -0.24∗ -0.31∗∗ -0.27∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Vaccine 0.19 0.26 0.20
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Scale Firm -0.09 -0.08
(0.08) (0.08)
Scope Firm -0.17∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Risk Portfolio -3.18∗∗∗ -3.45∗∗∗
(0.75) (0.72)
Screening Ratio 0.31 0.25
(0.22) (0.22)
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease Group Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATC1 (14 Dummies) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14861 14861 14861 14861 14861
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered by firms).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.5: Robustness Checks for the Probability of Drug Approval
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit1 Probit LPM LPM LPM
Research Alliance 0.270∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.015∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
M&A -0.313∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.012∗
(0.08) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Biologic 0.298∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.014∗ 0.020∗ 0.011∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Innovation Index 0.007 0.179 0.001 0.010 0.003
(0.12) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
# of Diseases by Project 0.093∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
University Project -0.123 -0.287∗ -0.022 -0.030∗ -0.017
(0.14) (0.15) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Vaccine -0.411∗ 0.108 0.027∗∗ 0.029 -0.030∗
(0.23) (0.24) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Scale Firm -0.000 -0.089 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007
(0.10) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Scope Firm -0.258∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Risk Portfolio -3.074∗∗∗ -3.194∗∗∗ -0.700∗∗∗ -0.702∗∗∗ -0.155
(1.16) (0.78) (0.13) (0.15) (0.10)
Screening Ratio -0.091 0.226 -0.005 -0.006 0.011
(0.26) (0.22) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)




Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease Group Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATC1 (14 Dummies) Yes Yes No No No
ATC2 (147 Dummies) No No Yes Yes No
Diseases (710 Dummies) No No No No Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9209 12010 14861 12010 14861
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered by firms).
1 Model 1 - Sample restricted to the R&D projects that at least achieve the preclinical phase.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
87
as suggested by the positive statistically significant coefficient of “# of Diseases by Project”. An
increase of “Scope Firm” decreases the probability of drug approval, suggesting that specialization
in few therapeutic classes might be a superior strategy than diversification, or that firms are oper-
ating above the optimum scope level. Higher “Risk Portfolio” is associated with lower probability
of drug approval. This variable controls for risk loving firms that focus on ATC1 or diseases that
is difficult to innovate. These firms might prefer to swing for the fences (blockbuster strategy) than
hit singles [Arora et al. (2009)]. The coefficient of “Screening Ratio” is positive but not statistically
significant, consequently it is not possible to conclude that more compounds brought to clinical trial
increase the innovation productivity.
Table 4.5 presents the robustness checks. As the variables of interest (“Research Alliance” and
“M&A”) are formed by firm choice, there is a potential endogeneity bias, if unobserved factors affect
the firm choice and the probability of drug approval. Different specifications, sample restriction,
and econometric modelling assumptions such as linear probability model with dummies variables
for specific diseases are used to mitigate this potential endogeneity problem. The results of columns
1 to 5 show that the coefficient of “Research Alliance” and “M&A” are statistically significant and
has the same sign of regression 5 - Table 4.4, the preferred model.
Some authors point out [Danzon et al. (2005), Arora et al. (2009)] that firms are more likely
to kill or advance projects based on economic considerations (market size, complementary down-
stream assets, competition, product cannibalization, and etc) in the discovery phase. After the
discovery phase, technical and scientific considerations would play a more important role than eco-
nomic incentives. The selection issue (killing or advancing projects based on unobserved factors
to the econometrician) is more problematic when the sample is composed by very heterogeneous
firms. For example, compared to pharmaceutical firms, biotechs under financial constraints might
advance poor quality projects to the clinical trials in order to keep receiving external funding [Guedj
(2005)]. In column 1 of Table 4.5, the same regression 5 of Table 4.4 is presented, but with the sam-
ple restricted to the R&D projects that at least achieve the preclinical phase, that is, R&D projects
discontinued in the discovery phase were excluded. This result has to be interpreted as the probabil-
ity of success conditioned to pass the discovery phase. Together with the fact that the coefficient of
“Screening Ratio” is not statistically significant in any regression of Table 4.4 and 4.5, the selection
issue doesn’t look to be a problem in this paper.
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Regressions 2 and 4 add the variables “Competition” and “Market Size”. Both coefficients are
not stable and not always statistically significant in other specifications not showed in this paper.
Therefore, no interpretation was provided about how these two variables would affect the probabil-
ity of drug approval, but the coefficients of “Research Alliance” and “M&A” are still statistically
significant and follows the same pattern of Table 4.4. The difference between regressions 2 and 4 is
that the first one is a Probit controlling for ATC1; whereas the last one is a Linear Probability Model
that accommodates 147 dummies for ATC2.
Regressions 3 and 5 of Table 4.5 are Linear Probability Model that control respectively for
ATC2 and 710 dummies for different diseases. The idea is to show that the results are not driven by
specific ATC2 or diseases, as the technology opportunity, risk and cost development, profitability
varies a lot among diseases. The coefficients of “Research Alliance” and “M&A” of Regression 5
are less statistically significant and with lower magnitude than of Regression 3, what makes sense
as the last regression control for more specific diseases level, removing part of variation. The most
conservative estimation (regression 5) indicates that: 1) research alliance has probability of drug
approval 1.5% higher than internal R&D projects; and 2) R&D projects originated from M&A has
probability of drug approval 1.2% lower than internal R&D projects.
Table 4.6 reports the probit estimates for the probability of drug approval. Column 1 split the
variable “Research Alliance” in “Vertical Alliance” and “Horizontal Alliance”. Both coefficients are
statistically significant and positive with similar magnitude. However, when the variable “Research
Alliance” is split in “Alliance_Big_Firm” and “Alliance_Small_Firm” in column 2, the first coef-
ficient is statistically significant and positive with a comparative higher value; whereas the second
coefficient is negative and statistically significant. These results suggest that the success of research
alliance depends more on who is the partner than if the research alliance was made in the same or
different ATC1, in which the licensor had previous successful experience in bringing a new drug to
the market.
In the column 3, the variable “M&A” is split in “Vertical M&A” and “Horizontal M&A”. Both
coefficients are statistically significant and negative with similar magnitude. If firms buy R&D
projects in order to specialize or diversify to other ATC1, both strategies have similar innovation
performance. However, when the variable “M&A” is split in “Small M&A” and “Big M&A” in
the column 4 , the first coefficient is statistically significant and become more negative; whereas
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Table 4.6: Probit Estimates for the Probability of Drug Approval
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
















Small M&A -0.41∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10)
Big M&A -0.08 -0.07
(0.10) (0.10)
Biologic 0.33∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Innovation Index 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.12
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
# of Diseases by Project 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
University Project -0.27∗ -0.25∗ -0.27∗ -0.25∗ -0.23∗
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
Vaccine 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.18
(0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22)
Scale Firm -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Scope Firm -0.17∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Risk Portfolio -3.44∗∗∗ -3.49∗∗∗ -3.38∗∗∗ -3.46∗∗∗ -3.48∗∗∗
(0.72) (0.69) (0.71) (0.71) (0.68)
Screening Ratio 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.30
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease Group Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATC1 (14 Dummies) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14861 14861 14861 14861 14861
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered by firms).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.7: Vertical Alliance vs Horizontal Alliance
Propensity Score Matching
ATET Std. Errors Z-Score Lower CI Upper CI
Vertical Alliance -0.015 0.02 -0.68 -0.06 0.03
Observations 2112
Note 1: Robust standard errors derived by Abadie and Imbens (2006 and 2012) are in parentheses.
Note 2: Covariates of Probit: Biologic, Innovation Index, # of Diseases by Project, University Project,
Vaccine, Scale Firm, Scope Firm, Risk Portfolio, Screening Ratio, Disease, ATC1 and Year.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, and *** p < 0.001
the second coefficient is not statistically different than the in-house R&D projects, the reference
category. This result suggests that R&D projects acquired from small-medium firms have lower
probability of success than R&D projects acquired from big firms.
In column 5, the variables “Research Alliance” and “M&A” are split respectively in “Alliance_
Big_Firm” vs “Alliance_Small_Firm”, and “Small M&A” vs “Big M&A”. Regression 5 confirms
the results of previous columns that size of partner matters for the innovation productivity, that is,
R&D projects developed in alliance or acquired from Biotechs and medium firms on average have
lower probability of drug approval than R&D projects developed in alliance or acquired from big
pharmaceutical firms.
Table 4.7 presents the impact of “Vertical Alliance” against “Horizontal Alliance”. The ATET
is not statistically significant. This result confirms the conclusion of regression 1 in Table 4.6, that
there is no difference in innovation performance between “Vertical Alliance” and “Horizontal Al-
liance”. Table 4.8 presents the impact of “Alliance_Big_Firm” against “Alliance_Small_Firm”. The
ATET is statistically significant at 1%, that is, “Alliance_Big_Firm” has innovation performance
about 10% higher than “Alliance_Small_Firm”. This result is aligned to the conclusion of regres-
sions 2 and 4 in Table 4.6. Table 4.9 presents the impact of “Vertical M&A” against “Horizontal
M&A”. The ATET is not statistically significant. This result confirms the conclusion of regres-
sion 3 in Table 4.6, that there is no difference in innovation performance between “Vertical M&A”
and “Horizontal M&A”. Table 4.10 presents the impact of “Big M&A” against “Small M&A”. The
ATET is statistically significant at 1%, that is, “Big M&A” has innovation performance about 3.5%
higher than “Small M&A”. This result is aligned to the conclusion of regressions 4 and 5 in Table
4.6.
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Table 4.8: Alliance_Small_Firm vs Alliance_Big_Firm
Propensity Score Matching
ATET Std. Errors Z-Score Lower CI Upper CI
Alliance_with_Big_Firm 0.107∗∗∗ 0.02 6.58 0.08 0.14
Observations 2112
Note 1: Robust standard errors derived by Abadie and Imbens (2006 and 2012) are in parentheses.
Note 2: Covariates of Probit: Biologic, Innovation Index, # of Diseases by Project, University Project,
Vaccine, Scale Firm, Scope Firm, Risk Portfolio, Screening Ratio, Disease, ATC1 and Year.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, and *** p < 0.001
Table 4.9: Vertical M&A vs Horizontal M&A
Propensity Score Matching
ATET Std. Errors Z-Score Lower CI Upper CI
Vertical M&A 0.001 0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.02
Observations 6702
Note 1: Robust standard errors derived by Abadie and Imbens (2006 and 2012) are in parentheses.
Note 2: Covariates of Probit: Biologic, Innovation Index, # of Diseases by Project, University Project,
Vaccine, Scale Firm, Scope Firm, Risk Portfolio, Screening Ratio, Disease, ATC1 and Year.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, and *** p < 0.001
Table 4.10: Small M&A vs Big M&A
Propensity Score Matching
ATET Std. Errors Z-Score Lower CI Upper CI
Big M&A 0.035∗∗∗ 0.01 6.86 0.03 0.05
Observations 6702
Note 1: Robust standard errors derived by Abadie and Imbens (2006 and 2012) are in parentheses.
Note 2: Covariates of Probit: Biologic, Innovation Index, # of Diseases by Project, University Project,
Vaccine, Scale Firm, Scope Firm, Risk Portfolio, Screening Ratio, Disease, ATC1 and Year.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, and *** p < 0.001
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4.7 Conclusion
This study found that: 1) on average the R&D projects developed by research alliance have higher
innovation performance than R&D projects developed internally, the exception is the R&D projects
developed by research alliances with a small firms, in which the probability of drug approval is
lower than R&D projects developed internally; 2) R&D projects originated from M&A have lower
innovation performance than R&D projects developed internally; 3) R&D projects developed in re-
search alliances with a big firm have higher probability to receive drug approval than R&D projects
developed by research alliances with a small firm; 4) R&D projects acquired via big scale M&A
have higher probability to receive drug approval than R&D projects acquired via small-medium
scale M&A, and 5) there is no difference in innovation productivity between the strategies special-
ization and diversification at ATC level 1.
Together these findings suggest that big pharmaceutical firms are not in-licensing “lemons”
projects or at least complementarities/synergies generated by the partnership more than compen-
sated loss due transaction cost and asymmetric information problems. Although, on average it
looks that R&D projects originated from small scale M&A are “lemons” projects, it might be the
case that firms are buying technology (research material, research tool, or specific technique) to
be integrated to internal capabilities and not an expected successful project. Furthermore, R&D
projects developed in alliance have higher probability of drug approval than R&D projects from
M&A, because the first is a specific selected combination of technology, know-how, research tools,
and effort; whereas the second is an acquisition of a bundle of R&D projects not individually tar-
geted, and consequently is more likely subject to asymmetric information problems, uncertainty,
and deeper strategic problem such as a pipeline crisis.
Although we run several specifications, control for several factors, and check our results with
matching estimators, our study has some limitations that can be addressed in future research. First,
we treat each R&D project originated from M&A as an individual and independent R&D project.
This assumption is more reasonable for internal R&D projects and R&D projects developed in
alliance, but not for R&D projects acquired by bundles via M&A. Furthermore, the rationality of
M&A goes beyond just improving innovation performance. Firms might engage in M&A to acquire
market power, distribution channel, brand, scale in production and advertising, etc. Second, this
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study was restricted to technical probability of success (drug approval), but little is known how the
three strategies making, allying, and buying affects the commercial probability of success, such as
revenue, market size, and probability to get a blockbuster. Third, although we pointed out to theories
that justify our hypothesis, we didn’t model the specific mechanisms that driver the differences in




We investigated three aspects of drug development process little explored in the literature: 1) com-
parative performance between NPOs and firms in conducting clinical trials; 2) how scientific and
technological specialization affects the timing of technological collaboration; and 3) how the strate-
gies making, allying, and buying affect the probability of drug approval. The main findings of this
study are: 1) firms complete each phase of clinical trial on average 13 months earlier than non-
profit organizations; 2) an increase of 10% in the licensor scientific specialization speeds up the
technological collaboration in 4 months, and an increase of 10% in the licensor technological spe-
cialization speeds up the technological collaboration in 5 months; and 3) considering that internal
R&D projects have a probability of drug approval of 4.2%, research alliance has probability of drug
approval 1.5% higher than internal R&D projects; whereas R&D projects originated from M&A has
probability of drug approval 1.2% lower than internal R&D projects. Together these findings inform
policy makers and managers on how to foster the innovation performance in the biopharmaceutical
industry.
One limitation of this study is that we couldn’t integrate in our analysis the cost of clinical
trial, the cost of R&D project, and the cost of research alliance. Neither we use in our analysis
the drug revenue, or other measure of commercial success like the probability of being blockbuster.
If private data becomes available, we can develop further our study. Other limitation is that we
estimated reduced form equations. For future research, we could model the specific mechanisms at
organization level that firms use: 1) to complete clinical trials faster than NPOs; 2) to speed up the
technological collaboration; and 3) to take decision among making, allying, and buying R&D.
An interesting research question related to our thesis is to investigate if patents and scientific
95
publications are complements or substitutes in terms of signaling strategies in the market for tech-
nology. Or in what conditions or factors make patents and scientific publications complements or
substitutes. For example, firms and NPOs might use different signaling strategy related to patents
and scientific publications. Our new methodology to track patents and scientific publications that
cite specific technologies and diseases could be used for this purpose and be applied to other high
tech sectors as well. Other research question to be explored given the availability of data is how
firms might restrict the publication of clinical trial results in comparison to NPOs. It is well known
that firms are more likely to impose some publication restriction to their employees, but there are a
lot of heterogeneity among firms.
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